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W 7"ILLIAM of Ockham developed a very important scientific principle
¥ called Ockham's Razor. Ockham's Razor states that, all other things
being equal, when there are two explanations for a phenomenon, the sim-
pler one is more likely to be correct.' In the context of this Article, Ock-
ham's Razor may be paraphrased as the proposition that, when a problem
in our society requires a solution and there are several solutions from
which to choose, the simplest solution may be the most effective. As a
fortuitous example, there are several ways of solving the problem of health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) that put their own financial concerns
ahead of optimum medical treatment for their members. One of the solu-
tions stands out with elegant simplicity: hold HMOs liable in tort when
they act unreasonably.
Many persons today belong to HMOs, which are responsible for pro-
viding health care to their members.2 Under the law as it now exists in
many jurisdictions, however, HMOs are not held liable in tort when their
decisions are made negligently.
3
Tort standards of care and obligations were developed to supply those
entities to which they applied with an incentive to act reasonably.4 In the
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. B.A., J.D., Yale
University. The author wishes to thank Geff Marczyk for his able and enthusiastic
assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. See 8 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 867 (15th ed. 1993).
2. See Michele M. Garvin, Health Maintenance Organizations, in HEALTH CARE
CORPORAT LAw: MANAGED CARE 1-1, 1-6 (Mark A. Hall & William S. Brewbaker III
eds., 1996) (discussing health maintenance organization (HMO) model of care).
All HMOs tend to work in the same way. See id. Each plan member chooses a
primary care physician from the HMO list. See id. These primary care physicians
perform routine services including checkups. See id. If the patient develops a
problem that requires further medical treatment or testing, the primary care physi-
cian refers that patient to one of the specialists on the HMO list. See id. at 1-7
("[T] he primary-care practitioner must generally authorize non-emergency care or
treatment before the treatment is provided."). The patient cannot obtain access to
specialist treatment unless referred by the primary care physician. See id. ("If the
member does not seek prior approval, payment for care may be denied."). Hence,
primary care physicians are called "gatekeepers," because they control patient ac-
cess to the other doctors in the HMO. See id.
3. For a discussion of the ways in which HMOs escape liability for tort when
their decisions are made negligently, see infra notes 26-70 and accompanying text.
4. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES 153-54 (1988) (discussing theory that liability and litigation would moti-
vate persons to act in safest manner possible); Robert E. Litan et al., The U.S.
(321)
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absence of tort liability or any alternative form of deterrent, HMOs are
free to act in whatever manner they select. Because they have no financial
incentive to act reasonably, HMOs are free to allow other concerns, such
as making money, to govern their conduct. Such a state of affairs does not
serve the interests of the HMO's patients or of society generally.
This Article proposes that the problem ofjuggernaut HMOs be solved
simply by reinstating the obligation that applies to most other members of
society: acting reasonably. Failure to act reasonably should be deterred by
liability in tort.
II. A PERSONIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
This Article turns first to a hypothetical situation to highlight the na-
ture of the problem faced by patients, doctors and others when HMOs are
not held responsible for their decisions. 5 The costs of the injuries HMOs
cause when they act unreasonably must fall on someone. Failing to hold
HMOs liable does not make the costs go away; rather, it imposes those
costs on someone else. That someone may be either the patient (if no one
is liable) the doctor (if the HMO is not liable) or the hospital that actually
provided the treatment. None of these alternatives-all of which are tan-
tamount to liability without fault-is preferable to placing the costs on the
party that generated them by its negligent decision.
A. The Dilemma
An elderly patient has just undergone an appendectomy. The sur-
geon feels strongly that the patient should remain in the hospital for five
days following the surgery. The HMO which covers the patient allows two
days for an appendectomy and denies the doctor's request for a five-day
stay. This decision means that the HMO will refuse to pay for the addi-
tional three days the doctor feels are necessary for this patient in this
situation.
What happens next will vary depending upon whether the physician
obeys the HMO or not. In the first scenario below, the physician obeys the
directives of the HMO. In the second, he or she does not.
Liability System: Background and Trends, in LIABILITY- PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 3
(Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988) ("Tort rules will efficiently deter
accident-causing behavior if responsibility for the costs of injuries is imposed on
those who can avoid or prevent accidents most cheaply."); see also TERRENCE F.
KIELY, MODERN TORT LAILrIY: REcOvERY IN THE '90s, at 288 (1990) ("In essence,
a duty [in tort law] represents a legally enforceable obligation to conform to a
particular standard of conduct.").
5. This situation is purely hypothetical, with no specific treatment protocol,
HMO, patient, doctor or hospital in mind. It is (the author hopes) overstated, as
hypotheticals tend to be.
322 [Vol. 43: p. 321
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After appealing the HMO decision through the HMO structure, the
doctor obeys the HMO and discharges the patient. The patient returns
home and dies the next day. If the patient had remained in the hospital,
the patient would probably have survived. The patient's estate files suit
against the doctor and the HMO.
2. Scenario II
The doctor is extremely uncomfortable with discharging the patient
and refuses to do so. The patient remains in the hospital for the five days
and returns home. The patient undergoes the same crisis as in Scenario I,
but because the patient is in the hospital, the patient recovers from it.
Recovery is thereafter uneventful.
When the hospital bills the HMO, the HMO refuses to pay for the
three days that it did not authorize. The hospital bills the patient. The
patient refuses to pay, arguing that he or she is covered by the HMO.
B. Summary of the Problem
The issues raised by the above scenarios center around the problem
of responsibility. The HMO has made a decision about paying for (or,
rather, not paying for) treatment that the physician involved has decided
is necessary. The question then becomes one of deciding what the conse-
quences of that decision should be. Assuming that the HMO did not act
with due care in denying the physician's request, because as a matter of
law due care should allow the physician's medical judgment to govern,
should the HMO be liable? By overruling the doctor's medical judgment,
the HMO has made a treatment decision of its own, one which turns out
to be determinative of the patient's fate. Whether or not the HMO is li-
censed to practice medicine, it has made a medical decision. Should it be
required to stand behind this decision?
Because of the network of immunities and special rules that HMOs
have persuaded legislatures and courts to adopt, HMOs often avoid re-
sponsibility for their treatment decisions. 6 This Article argues that HMOs
should be responsible for their decisions by being held liable when those
decisions are unreasonable. If the HMO controls the decision making
about a patient, the HMO should be held responsible for the competence
of its exercise of that power.
In Scenario I, the HMO has, by overruling the doctor without seeing
the patient, reached what is almost by definition a medically unreasonable
decision. The physician, against his or her better judgment, has obeyed
the HMO. The HMO decision has had the tragic consequence of causing
a death. The HMO has been negligent, and this negligence has caused
6. For a discussion of how HMOs are able to avoid liability in these situations,
see infra notes 26-70 and accompanying text.
1998]
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damage. All of the requirements of tort law have been met: (1) the HMO
had a relationship as insurer and health care provider to the decedent and
thus owed him or her a duty of care; (2) the HMO has been negligent by
overruling the physician; and (3) the HMO's negligence has caused injury.
Scenario II is a bit more complex, because the physician has dis-
obeyed the HMO's directions. It is important to remember that the physi-
cian, by his or her disobedience, has saved the patient's life. The
physician in the first scenario probably felt trapped into obeying the HMO
demand, albeit against his or her better judgment. Because the physician
acted against his or her better judgment, however, he or she is also a de-
fendant in the resulting lawsuit in Scenario I. If the HMO is immune from
suit, the physician will lose, because the physician was negligent in acting
against his or her better judgment, no matter what the HMO said. Even
though the decision was not in fact the physician's, the courts may treat it
as though it had been.
Perhaps to avoid this result, the physician in Scenario II refused to
obey the HMO and followed his or her medical judgment. The physician
in Scenario I may have acted in obedience to the HMO to avoid the prob-
lem that now arises for the physician in Scenario II: who will pay for the
additional three days in the hospital? The HMO refuses, the patient re-
fuses and the cost may remain where it is now, with the hospital. Hospi-
tals, however, cannot afford and should not have to absorb such costs.
in Scenario II, however, there is no basis for a tort suit because the
patient was not injured by the HMO decision. The patient would have
been injured if the doctor obeyed the HMO, but was saved because the
doctor did not. This is clearly a better end result for the patient. It should
also be the end result that the legal system encourages, because it saved a
life. Thus, it should be the economically better result for the HMO and the
hospital. If it is not, then there is something wrong with the law.
The problem is that the law has developed in a way that may make the
death in Scenario I less expensive or equally costly to the HMO in compar-
ison with the result in Scenario II. If the HMO is immune from suit in
Scenario I on whatever grounds (maybe because the doctor made the dis-
charge decision, a fictional but often effective argument), then it has no
financial interest in exercising due care to prevent the patient's death and
no incentive to allow the extra days the next time the issue arises. If the
HMO can be forced to pay for the treatment in Scenario II, then the
courts have allowed the anomalous result that the HMO is better off when
its negligent orders have been obeyed and the patient died, because in
Scenario I the HMO pays nothing and in Scenario II it pays for the addi-
tional care. If the HMO cannot be held liable in Scenario II (maybe be-
cause the doctor in fact disobeyed the HMO strictures), then the HMO is
equally well off in both scenarios, paying nothing in either case. Recall,
however, that the HMO caused the patient's death in the former scenario.
Is it appropriate for the HMO to be better off or, at worst, equally well off
[Vol. 43: p. 321
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in the two scenarios? The answer, of course, is no. To the extent that the
law allows such a result, the law is wrong.
7
This Article argues that the law is wrong precisely because it removes
the incentive effect of tort law. The solution to HMO irresponsibility lies
in simplifying the rules. The HMO should be liable in negligence when its
actions have been unreasonable and have caused harm. If the HMO had
been facing the prospect of a successful lawsuit in Scenario I, it would have
had a powerful incentive to allow the physician's medically reasonable de-
cision to govern.
This Article first turns to the question of how the law developed into
the senseless result that Scenario I sets forth.8 It then turns to the solu-
tion, arguing that tort law should be reinstated to do the job of enforcing
standards of care for which it was originally intended.9
III. HMOs: THE THRIFT INCENTIVE
HMOs are designed to save money. In the halcyon days of the 19 6 0s,
everyone believed that there were enough resources to allow all members
of our society access to the best-and most complete and expensive-
medical treatment. 10 As health care costs escalated, however, the belief
that there were enough resources to go around came into question. Even-
tually, the pendulum swung away from this point of view and an increased
emphasis on economizing in the health care arena appeared.1 1 This em-
phasis was a subtle one, because no one wanted openly to admit that soci-
7. Allowing the HMO to escape payment in Scenario II may also provide a
powerful disincentive for the hospital to provide treatment in the future. If the
hospital ends up paying the cost of the additional days, the hospital is more likely
to choose to obey the HMO the next time.
8. For a discussion of how the law has developed to allow HMOs to escape
liability, see infra notes 26-70 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of how tort liability can enforce standards of care, see infra
notes 71-97 and accompanying text.
10. Of course, this has never been the case. Economically disadvantaged
members of our society have never had access to the level of medical care available
to the wealthy and adequately insured. See Susan L. Goldberg, A Cure for What Ails?
Why the Medical Advocate Is Not the Answer to Problems in the Doctor-Patient Relationship,
1 WIDENER L. SVMP.J. 325, 341 (1996) (acknowledging fact that "the wealthy gener-
ally receive more and better quality health care than the poor"); Colleen M. Gro-
gan, The Medicaid Managed Care Policy Consensus for Welfare Recipients: A Reflection of
Traditional Welfare Concerns, 22J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 815, 831 (1997) (describ-
ing disparity of care between middle or upper income persons and poor); John V.
Jacobi, Patients at a Loss: Protecting Health Care Consumers Through Data Driven Qual-
ity Assurance, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 705, 714 n.29 (1997) ("The movement to managed
care is particularly frightening for vulnerable populations, such as the poor and
disabled."); Katherine L. Kahn et al., Health Care for Black and Poor Hospitalized Medi-
care Patients, 271 JAMA 1169, 1170 (1994) (finding that quality of hospital care for
insured Medicare patients is influenced by patients' race and financial characteris-
tics). The fact that not everyone had access to the best health care, however, did
not prevent the contrary belief from existing.
11. See generally Kenneth R. Wing, The Economic and Policy Environment of Health
Care Law, in HEALTH CARE CORPORATE LAw: FORMATION AND REGULATION 1-1, -18
1998]
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ety had accepted the idea that some of its members would be deprived of
adequate health care in order to cut costs. 2 The emphasis, however, ap-
peared nonetheless.'
3
HMOs were designed and developed, quite simply, to provide health
care more cheaply than the other entities that preceded them as service
providers had been able to do. 1 4 How they could do this, while maintain-
to -21 (Mark A. Hall ed., 1993) (discussing consequence of cost containment in
health cases). This commentator noted:
While cost containment may be technically achievable in abstract discus-
sion, the political difficulties should not be understated. Beyond the
problems of identifying a cost-containment strategy that will actually slow
the growth of health spending in measurable amounts of and resolving
competing ideological preferences for one approach over another lies an
even more formidable barrier to cost containment: Effective cost-con-
tainment necessarily will impose an enormous price on some existing
group of individuals or institutions.
Id. at 1-20.
12. See BARRY R. FuRow ET AL., THE LAw OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE 297 (1991) (stating that if society chooses to provide equal access to
health care regardless of ability to pay, it must either be willing to face limitless
expenditures of resources for health care or find nonmarket means of rationing
it).
13. See generally Timothy F. Murphy, Rationing of Care Underscores Need for Over-
sight, HARRISBURG PATRIOT & EVENING NEWS, May 19, 1997, at A9 (expressing con-
cern with HMOs rationing care). One commentator noted: "[T]hat HMOs and
[managed care organizations] are in the business of rationing care is something
providers and patients [know]. It is this underlying philosophy that care should be
'rationed' for the sake of finances that is anathema for all who have sworn to the
Hippocratic oath." Id. Direct financial incentives to physicians not to expend re-
sources on patient care are one way of rationing care. See generally HEALTH EDUC.
& HUMAN SERV. Div., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID MANAGED CARE:
MORE COMPETITION AND OVERSIGHT WOULD IMPROVE CALIFORNIA'S EXPANSION PLAN
(1995).
14. Somewhat ironically, HMOs originally evolved in response to the need of
the poor for access to medical treatment and not to curtail services at all. SeeJ.
Warren Salmon, The Health Maintenance Organization Strategy, in THE CORPORATE
TRANSFORMATION OF HEALTH CARE: ISSUES AND DIRECTIONS 83, 86-87 (J. Warren
Salmon ed., 1990) (discussing economic advantages offered by HMO method of
health care delivery). In 1932, a national health committee endorsed them as a
means of providing affordable health care to a public ravaged by the depression.
See id.
In 1971, the Nixon administration endorsed health care cost control, which
led to the approval of HMOs by the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare, and the House Committee on Ways and Means. This culminated in the pas-
sage of the Federal Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-
222, 87 Stat. 714 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1994)), for the funding, develop-
ment, enabling and regulation of any HMO that becomes certified under the act.
See Sara Mars, Note, The Corporate Practice of Medicine: A Call For Action, HEALTH
MATRIX, Winter 1997, at 241, 259 (discussing federal legislation regarding HMOs);
Michael A. Dowell, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine Must Go, HEALTHSPAN,
Nov. 1994, at 7, 9 (stating that "federal HMO Act incorporated many of the charac-
teristics that the corporate practice of medicine was designed to protect against");
see also 42 U.S.C. § 300e-]0 (prohibiting state laws which inhibit existence of
HMOs).
[Vol. 43: p. 321
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ing the same quality, has never been clear to this author.1 5 Indeed, the
combination of maintaining quality while cutting costs may prove impossi-
ble.1 6 In fact, although HMOs may provide health care more cheaply,
problems have arisen in the context of both the quality and quantity of the
health care they provide.
17
How do HMOs provide health care more cheaply? There are two ba-
sic methods for reaching such a result.18 One lies with providing the same
15. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Med. Ass'n, Ethical
Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330, 331 (1995) (expressing concern that man-
aged care incentives compromise quality and integrity of patient care). This Arti-
cle does not, of course, have any particular HMO in mind. On the one hand,
there are no doubt many HMOs that do their best to provide full health care treat-
ment to all of their participants. On the other hand, the law has developed in a
way that allows those HMOs that put remaining solvent ahead of complete patient
care to act on this priority. The power of regulation that tort law provides is only
needed for those HMOs that act unreasonably.
16. See Jack Olender, Doctors Agree Managed Care Cost-Cutting Is Hazardous,
WASH. INFORMER, Sept. 18, 1996, at 12 (discussing effect of cost cutting in medical
care). For the first time, the American Medical Association (AMA)
officially acknowledged what patients-especially medical malpractice pa-
tients-have long understood: When HMOs and other managed care or-
ganizations cut care to save money, the results are dangerous and
sometimes deadly. According to an American Medical Association survey
released in July, 71% of physicians believed managed care plans nega-
tively affect the quality of medical care. Ninety-two percent believe their
clinical independence is impaired. Half of doctors surveyed believe that
rationed medical care-the kind of care typically provided by managed
care organizations-leads to medical malpractice.
Id.
17. See Mark Holoweiko, Bypassing Primary-Care Physicians, MED. ECON., Apr.
14, 1997, at 3 (describing HMOs retreat from gatekeeper models). Many HMOs
have come under fire for the rationing of health care, especially in the area of
access to specialists. See id. The evidence is mounting, however, that HMOs are
being pressured to provide better care to their subscribers. For example, Blue
Shield of California now allows patients direct access to specialists within the plan
for a slightly larger copayment, Health Net allows enrollees to refer themselves to
many specialists within the plan at no extra charge, Minnesota's United Health-
Care allows enrollees direct access to panel specialists with no difference in copay-
ment and Pacificare of California lets primary care physicians bypass utilization
reviewers when sending patients to specialists within their practice groups. See id.
Although plans eventually approve the vast majority of specialty referrals anyway,
these changes reflect a heightened sensitivity to some of the challenges HMOs
have faced.
Managed care organizations contend that they do indeed provide less expen-
sive care while maintaining the quality of such care. See Barry R. Furrow, Incentiviz-
ing Medical Practice: What (If Anything) Happens To Professionalism?, 1 WIDENER L.
SyMP.J. 1, 3 (1996) (discussing increased inanagement of healthcare and claims by
managed care organizations that they maintain quality while decreasing costs); see
also Barbara Starfield et al., Costs vs Quality in Different Types of Primary Care Settings,
272JAMA 1903, 1907 (1994) (describing study that shows general lack of relation-
ship between quality and costs).
18. See Jeffrey M. Liggio, Preparing the HMO Case, (Medical Negligence) Trial,
TRIAL, May 1, 1997, at 4-5. One commentator stated:
HMOs try to limit costs of providing health care in two ways: by designing
and administering a plan that limits benefits, uses strict underwriting
7
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services, but using economies of scale and the like to reduce the costs of
the same services.19 The other, and the primary cause of concern for this
Article, lies with providing fewer services. 20
There are several means of reducing costs by cutting services.2 '
techniques or eligibility screening, and controls the quality of care, and
by aggressively applying direct cost containment measures that reduce
service options, shift patient care to less expensive locations, and mini-
mize the frequency of treatment .... HMOs also try to control costs by
linking physicians' payments with the organization's goals. For example,
the HMO may pay doctors through a risk-based or profit-sharing system.
If earnings increase as a result of the doctors' or the hospitals' cost-cut-
ting efforts, the doctors and hospitals receive a share of the profits in
addition to standard payments.
Id.
19. See Kevin J. Edgan & Rebecca L. Williams, Vertically Integrated Networks, in
HEALTH CARE CORPORATE LAW: MANAGED CARE, supra note 2, at 5-1,. -9 (noting
that economies of scale pressure participants in health care industry to pursue
vertical integration). Edgan and Williams stated: "Certificate of need and other
regulations designed to eliminate unnecessary duplication of services, as well as a
desire to avoid prohibitively high costs, give providers strong incentives to share
technology and equipment through vertical integration." Id. They also stated that
"[a]lthough all providers are concerned with quality of care, integration offers
seamless health care delivery, which tends to promote quality, consistency, and
information exchange." Id. at 5-11.
20. See Ellyn E. Spragins, When Your HMO Says No: How to Fight for the Treat-
ment You Need-and Win, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 1997, at 73 ("[Jlust saying no helps
your HMO charge your employer a nice low price-and still turn a profit."). The
justification for providing fewer services must be that the problem with the cost of
medical care lies with providing too many services. See Wing, supra note 11, at 1-15
("There is a popular perception that rising health care costs can be directly traced
to the seemingly insatiable demands of American consumers for dramatic, high-
tech, and invasive life-saving procedures. . . . Americans were paying more for
their health care in large part because they were receiving more."). No adequate
proof of the proposition that health care had become too expensive because of the
provision of excessive services seems to exist. See id. at 1-17 (stating that influences
of increased use of services or rising costs has diminished). One commentator
stated that
[a]t least in recent years, it is clear that consumers are not incurring in-
creasing costs because they are seeking medical care more often. Instead,
there is a noticeable increase in the number and complexity of the proce-
dures and tests received per treatment encounter .... Increased use of
health services has played an important role in increasing health care
costs, but that role has somewhat diminished in recent years relative to
other factors and lies primarily in increases in "intensity" and not in-
creases in rates of "utilization."
Id.
21. See Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review, and Financial Risk
Shifting: Compensating Patients for Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REv. 1, 20 (1993) (stating that HMOs can cut costs "by encouraging
fewer hospital admissions, more outpatient procedures, and fewer referrals to spe-
cialists"). In the course of discussing private sector cost containment, a few com-
mentators have pointed out that
[b]ecause the federal government and most states have not adopted a
comprehensive strategy for addressing health care costs, and because pri-
vate business itself obviously cannot exercise regulatory authority, private
business has largely relied on competitive approaches to health care cost
8
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These include setting standards for medical practice pursuant to which a
physician who orders a particular procedure must justify any deviation
from the normally applicable standards set by the HMO. For example, the
physician in hypothetical Scenario II sought permission to deviate from
the usual length of stay prescribed by the HMO. Another means is profes-
sional utilization review, which occurs when physicians or other qualified
professionals review a proposal for specific treatment of a particular pa-
tient.2 2 If the HMO had had no specified time limit for appendectomies,
the physician in our hypothetical might not have needed to obtain HMO
consent to the proposal of a five-day stay.
Clearly, if the HMO objective of economic health either competes
with or subsumes the patient's objective of physical health, then either of
the two techniques mentioned above could lead to substantial savings.
They could also lead to substantial harm if they are unregulated.
23
containment. These approaches [include] self-insurance, utilization re-
view, cost sharing, and contracting with alternative delivery systems ....
See FuRRow ET AL., supra note 12, at 363.
22. See FuRROW ET AL., supra note 12, at 365 (providing statistics that support
proposition that utilization review reduces number of services used). These com-
mentators noted that
[u]tilization review seems clearly to have reduced inpatient hospital use
and inpatient costs experienced by health plans that have used it. One of
the best studies found that it reduced admission of groups by 12.3%, in-
patient days by 8%, and hospital expenditures by 11.9%. In particular, it
reduced patient days by 34% and hospital expenditures by 30% for
groups that had previously high admission rates.... It is less clear that
utilization review reduces total health care costs, since it often moves care
from inpatient to outpatient settings .... Moreover, utilization review is
most effective in the short run and has less effect on long-term cost
increases.
Id.
23. One focus of concern has become HMO use of set standards in respond-
ing to nonstandard conditions. See Roukema Calls for End to "Drive-Through" Mastec-
tomies, Mar. 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4430570 (advocating passage of H.R.
135 requiring at least 48 hours of inpatient hospital care after mastectomies). One
commentator stated that
HMOs seem to be making a concentrated attack on the health concerns
of women .... First they were trying to discharge new mothers 12 hours
after giving birth. Now we will have outpatient drive-through mastecto-
mies. What will come next? I will not settle for third-world standards for
health care for women in this country. This is not legitimate cost-saving.
This is cold, callous rationing of care.
Id.
In California, the California Nurses Association filed a complaint alleging that
an HMO decision to cut emergency care constituted discriminatory rationing. See
Eric Brazil, Halt Kaiser Cuts, Nurses Tell State Gearing Up for Strike, Union Calls HMO's
Emergency Rooms Inadequate, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 13, 1997, at A6 (discussing nurses'
suit to "beef up" HMO's emergency care and to place it on probation); see also
David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit
Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 155, 161-62 (1996) (discussing traditional reliance of
patient on doctor's choosing treatment based on optimal outcome and not ration-
ing). One commentator pointed out that
[e]ven if there is no actual harm to the patient, there may be serious
9
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The remaining techniques seem fraught with even more peril than
those already mentioned. These include specific physician deterrence
from referring patients for additional treatment, whether by economic
pressure24 or peer pressure.
2 5
harm to the patient-physician relationship. Historically, physicians have
assumed a fiduciary role on behalf of their patients, assuring patients that
they will act primarily as advocates for the patient's interests. This fiduci-
ary role is a natural result of the condition of the patient and the role of
the physician. Patients are especially needy when they are sick, with their
health, and indeed their life, often hanging in the balance. At the same
time, they are especially dependent on their physicians, who possess not
only a virtual monopoly on the expertise to treat illness but also a virtual
monopoly on the use of medical therapies .... [W]hen physicians are
paid more to do less for their patients, patient trust in physicians will
naturally be eroded as patients begin to wonder whether tests and treat-
ments are being withheld because they are not medically indicated or
because physicians have a financial interest in denying the care.
Id.
24. See Orentlicher, supra note 23, at 162 (discussing problems associated with
HMO use of financial incentives on physicians to limit care). Economic pressure
would include, for example, reducing the physician's share of the leftover HMO
premiums in proportion to that physician's referral of patients. See id.
HMOs use direct financial incentives in a number of different ways to affect
physician behavior. As one commentator noted:
Micro-management encompasses a variety of ways in which the payor
.second guesses" a physician's recommendation and a patient's decision.
The most common form of micro-management is through various types
of utilization review....
The second approach that payors take towards managing care is
through panel selection. In a panel selection (and "de-selection") system,
the payor "manages" care indirectly by encouraging or requiring its cus-
tomers to use only particular physicians or facilities....
The third method of managing care is through direct financial in-
centives. These can take many forms, but the key is structuring the physi-
cian's compensation in ways that create incentives to practice
economically.
Henry T. Greely, Direct Financial Incentives In Managed Care: Unanswered Questions,
HEALTH MATRiX, Winter 1996, at 53, 55-56. One commentator noted that the use
of these financial incentives can have both negative and positive effects. See Oren-
tlicher, supra note 23, at 161-64. Orentlicher noted that
[c]ommentators have sharply criticized the use of financial incentives to
limit care. The most troubling aspect is the risk to patient welfare. If
physicians have a personal economic interest in limiting the care they
provide their patients, they may delay important tests and treatment or
omit the tests and treatment entirely. They may schedule patients for
return appointments at intervals between appointments that are too long,
or they may try to manage their patients' care too long, unduly stretching
the limits of their own expertise, before referring the patients to an ap-
propriate specialist. Physicians may also accelerate the date of a patient's
discharge from the hospital after surgery, increasing the risk that a com-
plication of the surgery will develop at home where appropriate care may
not be available quickly enough.
Id. at 161. Orentlicher further pointed out that
[w]hile the dangers of financial incentives are very real, there are also
very important benefits to using these incentives to limit health care costs.
There are two primary advantages of financial incentives. First, their use
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss2/1
OCKHAM'S SCALPEL
IV. HMOs AND THE LAW
This Article now turns to a brief look at how the law applicable to
HMOs has developed. HMOs have succeeded to a truly startling extent in
avoiding the application of tort law to their conduct. Unfortunately, no
alternative set of incentives has developed to replace tort law in this
context.
A. The Corporate Practice of Medicine Concept
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine prohibits corporations
from practicing medicine. 26 It was established to insure that patients
would be treated by doctors and not by corporations. 2 7 This prohibition is
ensures that the persons who ultimately must be responsible for cost con-
tainment-physicians-have sufficient incentive to pursue cost contain-
ment. Second, financial incentives preserve the ability of physicians to
individualize the care they provide their patients.
Id. at 164.
25. See Howard S. Zuckernam, Principles of Health Care Facility Organization and
Management, in HEALTH CARE CoRPoRATE LAw: FORMATION AND REGULATION, supra
note 11, at 2-1, -40 (stating that information about each physician's economic per-
formance is sometimes publicized to other medical staff so entire peer community
knows who is costing hospital money). Peer pressure would include circulating
lists within the HMO of those gatekeeper physicians who do the most referring of
patients, thereby costing the HMO, and the other HMO physicians, the most
money. See id. Studies of physician feedback programs have produced conflicting
results. See id. In a Vermont study, on the one hand, performance of tonsillecto-
mies was halved after physicians in certain areas were told that their performance
of the operation was 13 times greater than in other areas of the state. See id. (citing
J.E. Wennberg et al., Changes in Tonsillectomy Rates Associated with Feedback and Re-
view, 59 PEDIATRIcS 821 (1977)). On the other hand, a more recent study found
no favorable effect from publication of a physician's economic performance. See
id. (citing Sankey V. Williams & John M. Eisenberg, A Controlled Trial to Decrease the
Unnecessary Use of Diagnostic Tests, 1 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 8 (1986)).
26. See Dowell, supra note 14, at 7-8 ("Corporate medicine has existed in one
form or another since the post-World War I industrial revolution .... [T]he crea-
tion of state medical licensing requirements and efforts by the American Medical
Association led to the corporate practice of medicine doctrine .... ."). The doc-
trine prohibiting the corporate practice of medicine originated as an ethical re-
striction on a physician's economic relations, and arose out of the medical
profession's struggle for autonomy in the early 1900s. See id. The corporate prac-
tice prohibition is based on the principle that a corporation lacks the qualifica-
tions necessary to obtain a license to practice medicine. See Mars, supra note 14, at
242 (discussing origins of corporate practice of medicine doctrine in context of
state law); see also Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, Note, The Corporate Practice of Medicine
Doctrine: An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. Rv. 445,
448-50 (1987) (discussing corporate practice of medicine prohibition in context of
medical profession's struggle for autonomy in early nineteenth century).
27. See Chase-Lubitz, supra note 26, at 448 (discussing medical profession's
efforts to distinguish physicians from "quacks" and "sectarians"). The ultimate fear
was that corporate decision making would replace the medical judgment of the
physician. See id. Accordingly, the doctrine evolved to protect the public from
quackery and possible abuses stemming from the commercial exploitation of the
practice of medicine. See id. The leaders of the medical profession feared that if
physicians were permitted to work for corporations, corporations would ultimately
1998]
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based upon the premise-adhered to by the medical profession-that pa-
tients are individuals requiring the exercise of an individualized treatment
process. 28 Because corporations are compelled by their nature to a uni-
formity of approach that is viewed as anathema by the medical profession,
corporations are by definition incapable of practicing medicine.2 9 The
control the doctors' level of income, their methods of treatment and diagnosis and
their relationships with patients. See id. at 457-58 (describing possible impact of
corporate practice on medical profession). In retrospect, this seems somewhat
prophetic. See Lisa Rediger Hayward, Comment, Revising Washington's Corporate
Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 71 WASH. L. REv. 403, 405 (1996) (discussing why cor-
porate practice of medicine doctrine should only be retained to prevent lay inter-
ference with physician autonomy in medical decisions).
28. See, e.g., Parker v. Board of Dental Exam'rs, 14 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal. 1932)
(discussing divided loyalties between dentists and dental corporations); California
Ass'n of Dispensing Opticians v. Pearle Vision Ctr., 191 Cal. Rptr. 762, 768-69 (Ct.
App. 1983) (discussing legislative prohibitions of lay control over optometrists);
Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 664 N.E.2d 337, 343-44 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996) (citing concerns regarding lay control and divided physician loyalties as le-
gitimate public policy concerns), rev'd, 688 N.E.2d 106 (Ill. 1997); St. Francis Reg'l
Med. Ctr. v. Weiss, 869 P.2d 606, 612 (Kan. 1994) (stating that policy reasons for
corporate practice of medicine doctrine include "(1) [clorporate judgment may
be substituted for medical judgment, (2) corporations are not subject to standards
of ethics, and (3) an independent judgment on the part of the physician is neces-
sary to serve as a patient advocate"); see also Patricia Jacobsen, Prohibition Against
Corporate Practice of Medicine: Dinosaur or Dynamic Problem, in HEALTH LAW HAND-
BOOK 67, 68, 78-98 (1993) (stating that corporations lack qualifications necessary
for license to practice medicine and, therefore, cannot legally hold one).
29. In order to prevent corporate promulgation of poor medical practice and
to prevent commercial exploitation, most states have laws that prohibit a corporate
entity from directly or indirectly providing medical services. See ALA. CODE § 34-24-
50 (1995) (defining practice of medicine with no specific exemptions for corpora-
tions); ALAsKA STAT. § 08.64.380(6) (Michie 1995) (same); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-
95-202(2)(A)-(E) (Michie 1995) (same); id. § 17-95-401 (prohibiting persons from
practicing medicine without first obtaining valid license); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 2052 (West 1995) (stating that those who practice, attempt to practice or adver-
tise without certificate are guilty of misdemeanor); id. § 2400 (preventing most
corporations from having professional rights); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-
106(1) (a) (f) (West 1995) (defining practice of medicine with no corporate excep-
tions); id. § 12-36-129 (imposing class two misdemeanor penalties on any corpora-
tion or other entity that violates requirements for practicing medicine); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-9 (West 1995) (prohibiting practice of medicine without li-
cense); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1731 (b) (5) (1995) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-
34-26(a) (1995) (same); id. § 43-34-20(3) (defining practice of medicine with no
exceptions for corporations); HAw. REv. STAT. § 453-1 (1993) (same); 225 ILL.
COmP. STAT. ANN. 60/3 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997) (prohibiting practice of
medicine by persons without valid license); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-22.5-1-1.1 (West
1995 & Supp. 1997) (defining practice of medicine with no corporate exceptions);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.2 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997) (prohibiting unlicenced prac-
tice of medicine); id. § 148.1 (defining practice of medicine with no corporate
exceptions); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2869 (1995) (same); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 311.560 (Michie 1995) (same); id. § 311.595(11) (stating that license of any prac-
titioner will be revoked if he or she aids, assists or abets unlawful practice of
medicine); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 333.17011(1) (West 1992) (prohibiting unli-
censed individuals from practicing medicine); Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-25-1 (1993)
(requiring license to practice medicine); id. § 73-25-33 (defining practice of
12
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prohibition against the practice of medicine by corporations protects phy-
sicians and patients by preventing a third party-the impersonal corpora-
tion-from making treatment decisions that both fail to take into account
the individualized nature of medical treatment and run the risk of al-
lowing some motive (such as profit) to intervene between patient and
care. 30 Corporations are likely to be more interested in corporate welfare
than in patient welfare. 31 Physicians (and patients) are more likely to fo-
medicine with no corporate exceptions); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 334.010 (West 1996)
(prohibiting practice of medicine without license); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-3-
301(1) (1997) (same); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1,102 (1996) (defining practice of
medicine with no corporate exceptions); NEv.'REv. STAT. § 630.020(1)-(4) (1996)
(same); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 329:1 (1995) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-20(a)
(West 1996) (prohibiting practice of medicine without license); id. § 45:9-18 (de-
fining practice of medicine with no corporate exceptions); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-6-
20 (Michie 1995) (prohibiting practice of medicine without license); N.Y. Enuc.
LAw § 6522 (McKinney 1996) (restricting practice of medicine to those who are
licensed); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-67-170(c) (1995) (prohibiting HMOs from practic-
ing medicine); id. § 90-18 (prohibiting practice of medicine without license);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.41 (Anderson 1997) (prohibiting practice of
medicine without state board certificate); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 492(C) (West
1995 & Supp. 1997) (defining practice of medicine with no corporate exceptions);
OR. REv. STAT. § 677.085 (1995) (same); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 422.10 (West
1996) (limiting practice of medicine to licensed medical doctors); R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 5-37-12 (1995) (defining unauthorized practice of medicine); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 40-4740 (Law Co-op. 1996) (defining practice of medicine with no corporate
exceptions); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 36-4-8.1 (Michie 1995) (prohibiting corporate
practice of medicine); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-204(a) (1) (1997) (defining prac-
tice of medicine); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1314(a) (1995) (describing penalty for
practicing medicine without license); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2902 (Michie 1995)
(prohibiting practice of medicine without license and allowing no corporate ex-
ceptions); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 18.71.021 (West 1995) (prohibiting practice of
medicine without license); W. VA. CODE § 30-3-13(a) (1996) (prohibiting unli-
censed practice of medicine); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 33-26-102(a) (xi) (Michie 1997)
(defining practice of medicine without corporate exceptions); see also Kerner v.
United Med. Serv., 200 N.E. 157, 162-68 (Ill. 1936) (prohibiting corporation from
practicing medicine); Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 40 (1977) (prohibiting any corporation
organized under Nevada general corporation statute from engaging in practice of
medicine); N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. 50 (1963) (prohibiting New York corporations
from bringing together physicians and patients as against public policy of state).
30. See Hayward, supra note 27, at 406 (discussing rationale of corporate prac-
tice of medicine doctrine and noting that doctrine is means to protect public from
possible abuses stemming from commercial exploitation of practice of medicine).
31. See Dowell, supra note 14, at 7 (noting that some of early fears that led to
development of corporate practice of medicine doctrine revolved around loss of
sanctity of independent physician-patient relationships and conflicting interests of
physicians and profit-oriented corporations). The Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina noted that if corporations were allowed to practice medicine, "professional
standards would be practically destroyed, and professions requiring special train-
ing would be commercialized, to the public detriment." Ezell v. Ritholz, 198 S.E.
419, 424 (S.C. 1938). Over time, these fears became more well defined and
evolved into five specific reasons for the prohibition of the practice of medicine by
corporations:
(1) lay persons should not have control over any professional judgment;
(2) commercial exploitation of medical practice creates a division of phy-
sician loyalty between a patient and the employer/contractor, and would
13
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cus on the patient.3 2 At least this is the theory.
The preceding should highlight the extent to which the existence of
HMOs and their concomitant standardized protocols is inconsistent with
the corporate practice of medicine doctrine and the premises upon which
it is based. HMOs make treatment decisions by setting standards and mak-
ing it difficult, if not impossible, for doctors to deviate from them. One
would think that HMOs and their standard-setting powers would them-
selves be foreclosed from existence under this doctrine, given that the
doctrine developed out of the premise that the only good medical treat-
ment is individual treatment because all patients are unique. 33 As far as
the medical profession is concerned, no two appendectomies are exactly
alike. As the presenting conditions of patients become more complex, the
unshared aspects increase in importance. HMOs, however, are based
upon the premise that patients with similar conditions should be treated
exactly the same. All appendectomies are alike in the eyes of the HMO.
34
destroy the patient/physician relationship; (3) the presence of a corpo-
rate entity is incongruous in the workings of a professional regulatory
licensing scheme which is based on personal qualification, responsibility
and sanction; (4) a corporation is incapable of the relation of personal
confidence and trust requisite to the physician/patient relationship; and
(5) a corporation may be more concerned about the level of profit than
the patient's well-being or quality of care.
Dowell, supra note 14, at 8. HMOs exhibit the type of behavior that the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine was designed to prevent, including lay control, di-
vided loyalty and commercialism. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c) (1994) (proscribing or-
ganizational requirements for HMOs).
32. See Dowell, supra note 14, at 8 (stating that personal confidence and trust
between patients and their physician is crucial in establishing and maintaining
physician-patient relationship).
33. Despite the fact that individualized care, which a corporation will not pro-
vide, is required, many jurisdictions no longer enforce this doctrine to preclude
corporations from making medical decisions. See id. at 7 (noting that influence
and applicability of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine has diminished in
recent years). In fact, in the vast majority of states, the doctrine may as well not
exist. See Hayward, supra note 27, at 413-14 (discussing how only 5 states were
enforcing doctrine, 26 states were either neglecting doctrine or were ambiguous
about its application and 19 states were either ignoring doctrine or had repudiated
it); see also John Wiorek, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Outmoded
Theory in Need of Modification, 8J. LEGAL MED. 465, 471-84 (1987) (reviewing status
of corporate practice of medicine doctrine in each state). Thus, corporate prac-
tice of medicine doctrine is considered to be firmly established in only five states:
California, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas and Texas. See id. at 473. Many states enforce the
doctrine sporadically and 19 states either ignore or have repudiated the doctrine.
See id. at 476-77, 483.
34. SeeJohn Protos, Ten Things Your HMO Won't Tell You, SMARTMONEY, Mar.
1, 1996 at 134 (discussing proposition that HMOs generally ignore concerns of
individual client). According to one commentator:
Number crunchers at actuarial firms collect historical data and perform
outcome studies on different procedures and lengths of stay. Then they
provide the information to the HMOs to be used as industry standards.
So never mind how you're feeling. If you've had a caesarean section, you
should leave the hospital within 48 hours. You've had a stroke? You're
[Vol. 43: p. 321
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The interaction of HMOs and the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine has spawned two ironies. The first is that HMOs argue that a
number of safeguards exist that protect patients from the uniformity of
HMO standards. 35 These include the theory of corporate negligence as
applied to hospitals,3 6 the independent obligations of doctors to their pa-
tients3 7 and statutory duties prohibiting fraud and abuse imposed on phy-
sicians.3 8 These arguments are ironic because they all involve obligations
that require the entities controlled by HMOs to disobey HMO strictures.
39
The second irony is that HMOs use the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine, which was developed to protect patients, as a shield
against liability.40 The doctrine can allow HMOs to escape liability for
typically headed home within three days, even if you can't walk out on
your own.
Id.
35. See Mars, supra note 14, at 270-74 (stating that managed care proponents,
in response to criticism, cite several safeguards that they claim provide better pub-
lic protection than corporate practice of medicine doctrine). The theories that
managed care proponents cite as evidence that the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine is not necessary include (1) the independent duty of hospitals to their
patients (the corporate negligence liability theory); (2) the independent duty of
physicians to their patients; (3) fraud and abuse statutes; and (4) antireferral stat-
utes. See id.
36. See id. at 271 (stating that hospital "may be held liable for the negligent
treatment of patient in its care under corporate negligence theory of liability").
The fear of lay control or division of loyalty among the physician, the hospital and
the patient can be minimized by imposing direct corporate liability. See id. at 270-
74 (discussing how courts have held hospitals liable for failing to ensure that their
staffs monitor patients). Presumably, HMOs are not arguing that they should be
liable under a similar theory.
37. See id. at 272-73 (discussing "physician's independent duty"). If a physi-
cian chooses to prioritize a corporation's interest over that of a patient in regard to
treatment, the resulting violation of the standard of care could result in liability
under a medical malpractice theory. See id. (stating that when physician's level of
care falls below standard of care, physician may be held liable for malpractice and
that physician must balance corporate policies with responsibility to patient).
38. See id. at 274 (discussing Medicare-Medicaid fraud and abuse statutes and
antireferral statutes). Managed care organizations argue that the commercializa-
tion of medicine is unlikely because of the Medicare-Medicaid fraud and abuse
statutes and antireferral statutes. See id. (noting that antireferral statutes reduce
potential risk for commercial abuse because they discourage physicians from estab-
lishing clinics or affiliating with other medical facilities to exploit patients for their
own profit). Each statute deters divided loyalties and over commercialization by
providing for strict penalties and sanctions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994)
(providing that violation of Medicare-Medicaid fraud and abuse statutes carries
civil monetary penalties of up to $25,000, criminal sanctions of up to five years in
prison and loss of provider status); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g) (3) (1994) (stat-
ing that civil monetary penalties of up to $15,000 for each service in violation of
Medicare-Medicaid fraud and abuse statutes may be imposed).
39. These remedies require that physicians be willing to disobey HMO edicts,
and that the failure to do so constitutes malpractice for which the physician be-
comes liable.
40. See Wiorek, supra note 33, at 466-67 (noting that corporate practice of
medicine doctrine may be used as shield by insurance companies seeking to avoid
15
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medical malpractice by arguing that they were not making treatment deci-
sions.4 1 The irony here is that HMOs do, in fact, make treatment deci-
sions. HMOs prevent doctors from exercising their individual judgment
in a given case, but have somehow succeeded in persuading at least some
paying claims); see also Freedman v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 849 P.2d 811, 816-
17 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that because HMO is statutorily deemed not to
be practicing medicine, HMO cannot direct actions of member physicians and,
therefore, is not liable for negligence under respondeat superior doctrine);Jolly v.
Michael Reese Health Plan Found., 587 N.E.2d 1063, 1067 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(holding HMO is statutorily immune from liability for malpractice); Moshe v.
Anchor Org. for Health Maintenance, 557 N.E.2d 451, 460 (Il. App. Ct. 1990)
(noting that because HMO has state statutory exemption, HMO is not liable under
negligence claims); Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58, 60-61 (Mo.
1989) (holding that HMO was not liable for medical negligence because of statu-
tory immunity); Propst v. Health Maintenance Plan, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 1142, 1143
(Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (holding that under state statute HMO is not considered to
be engaged in the practice of medicine and, thus, can not be liable for malprac-
tice); Williams v. Good Health Plus, Inc.-HealthAmerica Corp., 743 S.W.2d 373,
374-76 (Tex. App. 1987) (holding that HMO was incapable of practicing medicine
under state statute and, therefore, could not, as matter of law, be held liable for
malpractice).
41. Although most states prohibit the corporate practice of medicine, most
states have also legislated that HMOs are not considered to be practicing
medicine. See ALASKA STAT. § 21.86.260(c) (Michie 1995) (stating that HMOs are
not considered to be practicing medicine); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-76-109(a)(3)
(Michie 1995) (same); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-421(3) (West 1995) (deem-
ing HMOs as not engaged in practice of medicine and exempting HMOs from laws
pertaining to practice of medicine); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9112(a) (1995) (ex-
empting HMOs from laws pertaining to the practice of medicine); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 617.2001(2) (West 1995) (allowing nonprofit corporations to engage in practice
of medicine); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-21-28(c) (1995) (deeming HMOs as not practic-
ing medicine); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-22.5-1-2(a) (21) (D) to (c) (West 1995) (deem-
ing HMOs as not practicing medicine only if HMOs do not interfere with
physicians' decision making and only if shareholders are licensed to practice
medicine); KA. STAT. ANN. § 40-32089(a)(2) (1995) (granting HMOs ability to
provide medical care through providers); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4222.2
(West 1995) (stating that HMOs should not be deemed to be practicing
medicine); MD.'CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. I. § 19-704 (1995) (allowing HMOs to
operate notwithstanding prohibition against corporate practice of medicine);
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 176C, § 2 (West 1996) (deeming HMOs as not practic-
ing medicine and, therefore, not subject to laws relating to practice of medicine);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62D22-3 (West 1996) (stating that HMOs are not considered as
practicing medicine); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-31-111(3) (1997) (deeming HMO as
not practicing medicine); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:21-25(c) (West 1996) (same); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 59A-46-30(c) (Michie 1995) (same); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1742.01(G) (3) (a) (Anderson 1997) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2505
(West 1995) (prohibiting HMOs from engaging in practice of medicine); 40 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1554(b)(3) (West 1996) (allowing HMOs to furnish health
care by employing providers); R.I. GEN. LAws § 27-41-5(a)(3) (1995) (allowing
HMOs to provide health care by contracting with providers); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 38.2-4319(C) (Michie 1995) (construing HMOs as not engaged in unlawful prac-
tice of medicine); W. VA. CODE § 33-25A-24(c) (1996) (considering HMOs not to
be engaged in practice of medicine and, therefore, exempt from laws pertaining to
practice of medicine); see also Mars, supra note 14, at 281-300 (listing states that
have legislated that HMOs are not considered to be practicing medicine).
[Vol. 43: p. 321
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courts that their control over the physicians in their employ does not con-
stitute the practice of medicine.
42
Ironically, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, designed to
provide patients with a sword against uniform (and, therefore, wrong-
headed) treatment, has become a shield that allows HMOs to perform
precisely the function that the doctrine was designed to prevent.4 3 Doc-
tors, not corporations, practice medicine. Therefore, doctors, and not
corporations, are liable for negligence. This ignores the reality of medical
practice today, in which doctors are often under the complete control of
the HMOs and those within the HMOs who, never having seen the pa-
tient, are deciding what treatment the patients should receive. 4 4 Not only
are the HMO personnel deciding on treatment without seeing the patient,
they may not even be doctors themselves. 45 Their goal is corporate, not
patient, well-being.
B. ERISA
In an irony comparable to the use of the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine as a defense, HMOs have successfully used the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 46 to protect their power
to make medical decisions. 47 In those cases won by the HMOs, they have
42. See, e.g., Propst, 582 N.E.2d at 1143 (finding that HMO was not liable for
negligent acts of physicians with whom it contracted because "[HMO does] not
practice medicine, [and therefore it] may not be held liable under a complaint
which sounds in medical malpractice").
43. See Mars, supra note 14, at 260 ("HMO structure embodies characteristics
which the corporate practice of medicine doctrine was designed to avoid.").
44. See Jennifer L. D'Isidori, Note, Stop Gagging Physicians!, HEALTH MATRIX,
Winter 1997, at 187, 194 (discussing HMO control over physicians through gag
provision in physicians contracts that "prevent physicians, either explicitly or im-
plicitly, from giving patients information about treatment options that are not cov-
ered by their health plans, even if the treatment options are necessary, safe, and
effective"); Ellyn E. Spragins, Beware Your HMO, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 23, 1995, at 54
(noting that problems of divided loyalties between physicians and HMOs have pro-
duced adverse health consequences for HMO patients).
45. SeeJ. Anthony Manger, Scrap Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, HEALTH.
SPAN, May 1994, at 2 (noting that some HMOs are part of investor-owned chains
and governing boards of these HMOs consist of lay people who are answerable to
stockholders); see also Mars, supra note 14, at 260 ("The decision to approve medi-
cal procedure or lengths of hospital stays for HMO subscribers is often made by lay
persons.").
46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
47. See, e.g., McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org., 604 A.2d 1053, 1062-63
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that plaintiff's breach of contract claim was pre-
empted by ERISA); see also Elsesser v. Hospital of Phila. College of Osteopathic
Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286, 1290-92 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (ruling that plaintiff's claims
against HMO for intentional misrepresentation pertaining to qualifications of
plaintiff's physician and breach of contract were preempted by ERISA). Tradition-
ally, HMOs have been shielded from state lawsuits by federal law. See, Frank Bass,
Texas Lawmakers Set to Prescribe New Pro-Patient Rules for HMOs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27,
1996, at TI (discussing fact that managed care industry is being battered by
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argued that ERISA preempts tort suits against them, because their service
is part of the employment benefits of the affected individual. 48 In the
proconsumer legislation and that state claims were frequently preempted by
ERISA).
48. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987) (holding
that tortious breach of contract claim against HMO was preempted by ERISA's
exclusive civil enforcement scheme). ERISA is a comprehensive federal statute
designed to promote and protect the interests of employees and their beneficiaries
in employee benefit plans and was intended to establish pension plan legislation as
a solely federal concern. See L. Frank Coan Jr., Note, You Can't Get There from
Here-Questioning the Erosion of ERISA Preemption in Medical Malpractice Actions
Against HMOs, 30 GA. L. REV. 1023, 1036-56 (1996) (discussing HMO tort liability
and preemptive effect of ERISA on state law). ERISA establishes minimum stan-
dards for employee benefit plans and provides for uniform remedies in the en-
forcement of such plans. See DianaJoseph Bearden & BryanJ. Maedgen, Emerging
Liability in the Managed Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 282, 337 (1995)
(discussing how ERISA protects and promotes interests of employees and their
beneficiaries through employee benefit plans). Because HMOs are frequently part
of an employer's benefit plan, HMOs serving as components of employer-provided
benefit plans often use ERISA preemption to limit or avoid liability, especially in
malpractice litigation. See id. (stating that employers often sponsor HMOs through
qualified benefit plans); Coan, supra, at 1036 (stating that HMOs serving as compo-
nents of employer-provided benefit plans often use ERISA preemption to limit or
avoid liability). Preemption serves as a complete bar to all state claims and pro-
vides the HMO with a statutory right of removal to federal court. See id. Moreover,
preemption can protect HMO defendants from jury trials and the award of puni-
tive damages, even in cases that proceed to federal trial, because ERISA does not
allow a jury trial or allow for the recovery of punitive damages. See MARK A. ROTH-
STEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENr LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 468 (3d ed.
1994); see also Pilot Life Insurance, 481 U.S. at 43-44 (holding that scope of preemp-
tion includes both statutory and common law claims); Coan, supra, at 1036 ("ER-
ISA does not entitle plaintiffs to a jury trial or allow for the recovery of the
extracontractual compensatory or punitive damages."). As one authority argues:
Claims dealing with denials of benefits under an employee benefit plan
will likely be preempted by ERISA. Likewise, misrepresentation and
breach of contract claims will likely be preempted by ERISA on the basis
that they relate to a benefit plan, even though they are not claims dealing
directly with the denial of coverage or the failure to pay benefits. In con-
trast, ERISA may not preempt when the claim is a "run of the mill" state
common law negligence claim. HMOs may be able to argue successfully
that claims of direct corporate liability are preempted since such claims
implicate the administration of the plan by the HMO.
Bearden & Maegden, supra, at 345; see Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d
151, 154-55 (10th Cir. 1995) (ruling that ERISA did not preempt state claim that
HMO was vicariously liable because state claim did not involve administration of
benefits, but that ERISA did preempt loss of consortium claim against HMO alleg-
ing negligent or fraudulent administration of employee benefit plan); Dukes v.
U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiffs med-
ical negligence claim was not preempted because plaintiff attacked quality of bene-
fits); Rodriguez v. Pacificare of Tex., Inc., 980 F.2d 1014, 1017 (5th Cir. 1993)
(ruling plaintiffs state law claims against HMO preempted by ERISA because
HMO was health benefits provider); Santitoro v. Evans, 935 F. Supp. 733, 737
(E.D.N.C. 1996) (ruling that plaintiffs state law claim was based on vicarious liabil-
ity was not preempted because claim involved quality of care); Roessert v. Health
Net, 929 F. Supp. 343, 350 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (stating that court lacks removal juris-
diction when cause of action for liability relates solely to HMO's administrative
[Vol. 43: p. 321
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opinions in which the HMO loses on the preemption argument, courts
have not hesitated to point out the irony in allowing ERISA, a statute
designed to protect workers, to protect HMOs at the expense of workers. 49
As one court stated:
role); Prihoda v. Shipritz, 914 F. Supp. 113, 118 (D. Md. 1996) (holding that ER-
ISA did not preempt plaintiffs vicarious liability claims because complaint was con-
cerned with quality of benefits and not administration); Chaghervand v. CareFirst,
909 F. Supp. 304, 311 (D. Md. 1995) (ruling that plaintiffs vicarious liability claim
was not preempted by ERISA because claim did not involve ERISA objectives);
Dees v. PrimeHealth, 894 F. Supp. 1549, 1556 (S.D. Ala. 1995) (holding that ER-
ISA preempted state law claim because Alabama statute was connected to HMO's
employee welfare benefits);Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820, 824-26 (D. Md.
1995) (holding that medical malpractice claim did not relate to plan administra-
tion when plaintiff argued negligent care by provider); Haas v. Group Health Plan,
Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544, 548 (S.D. Ill. 1994) (stating that negligence claims based on
negligent selection and retention are preempted by ERISA because they generally
interfere with administration of benefit plan); Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med.
Serv., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 110, 113 (D. Md. 1994) (ruling that state law claims against
plan administrator were preempted by ERISA); Dearmas v. Av-Med, Inc., 865 F.
Supp. 816, 818 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that ERISA did not preempt negligence
claim because claim did not relate to plan administration); Kearney v. U.S. Health-
care, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that ERISA preempted
wrongful death, misrepresentation and breach of contract claims because claims
arose over how employer benefits were administered); Visconti v. U.S. Health
Care, 857 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that state law claims based
on HMO's own negligence in administration or management of benefit plan were
preempted by ERISA); Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125, 129 (D.N.J. 1994) (preempt-
ing plaintiffs vicarious liability claim because plaintiff was covered through em-
ployer's benefit plan); Smith v. HMO Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669, 671-72 (N.D.
Ill. 1994) (ruling that ERISA did not necessarily preempt medical malpractice
claims when contractual relationship was present); Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO,
844 F. Supp. 966, 972-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that wrongful death claim suit
brought under state law was preempted because services were provided through
employer benefit plan); Pickett v. Cigna Healthplan of Tex., Inc., 742 F. Supp. 946,
947 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (ruling that medical malpractice claim was not preempted
under ERISA because physician rotation system did not relate to administration of
plan).
49. See Scholtens v. Schneider, 671 N.E.2d 657, 667 (111. 1996) ("The purpose
of ERISA is to protect employees, not to provide loopholes through which ERISA
plans can avoid paying their debts."). Thus, courts are divided over ERISA pre-
emption. Courts seem to agree that ERISA preempts liability based on HMO neg-
ligence, but do not agree on whether ERISA preempts vicarious HMO liability. See
Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298, 303 (8th Cir. 1993) (ruling that
ERISA preempted plaintiffs vicarious medical malpractice claim because it "relates
to" HMO's administration of plaintiffs benefit plan); Corcoran v. United Health
Care, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1322 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that ERISA preempted
medical malpractice action brought against administrative entity whose function
involved furnishing medical benefits and giving "medical advice").
Courts are undecided on the question of preemption in the vicarious liability
context. Compare Rodriguez, 980 F.2d at 1017 (holding that ERISA preempts medi-
cal malpractice claims based on vicarious liability), Pomeroy, 868 F. Supp. at 113-14
(same), Butler, 853 F. Supp. at 129 (same), Nealy, 844 F. Supp. at 972-73 (same),
and Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316, 317 (D.N.J. 1993) (same), with Burrage,
59 F.3d at 153-54 (ruling that ERISA does not preempt medical malpractice claims
based on vicarious liability), Roessert, 929 F. Supp. at 353 (same), Schachter v.
Pacificare of Okla., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1448, 1451-52 (N.D. Okla. 1995) (same),
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Prihoda, 914 F. Supp at 118 (same), Chaghervand, 909 F. Supp. at 311 (same), Jack-
son, 878 F. Supp. at 826 (same), Haas, 875 F. Supp. at 548 (same); Dearmas, 865 F.
Supp. at 818 (same); Kearney, 859 F. Supp. at 186-88 (same), Burke v. Smithkline
Bio-Science Lab., 858 F. Supp. 1181, 1184 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (same), and HMO Great
Lakes, 852 F. Supp. at 671-72 (same).
It also appears that suits against HMOs dealing with the denial of benefits are
more likely to be preempted by ERISA, while common law causes of action for
medical malpractice are less likely to be so. See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 48,
at 33745 (discussing evolving trend in which claims against HMOs for failure to
provide benefits will likely be preempted by ERISA, but common law medical mal-
practice actions involving HMOs will not be preempted). One problem may lie in
deciding whether a particular cause of action is one for malpractice or the denial
of benefits; a denial of benefits may be malpractice. In Carcoran, a pregnant
mother was denied disability benefits and hospitalization under an employee bene-
fit plan even though she was undergoing high-risk pregnancy. Corcoran, 965 F.2d
at 1323-24. After the fetus died, the parents brought suit against the utilization
review organization. See id. at 1324. The plaintiffs claimed that the refusal of bene-
fits was an erroneous medical decision. See id. The defendant argued that the
decision was made by the benefit plan as to what benefits were available under the
plan. See id. at 1325 (arguing that relationship between defendant and plaintiff
"came into existence solely as a result of an ERISA plan and was defined entirely by
the plan," and asserting that plaintiffs state law claims, therefore, were pre-
empted). The court held that the cause of action was preempted by ERISA even
though the defendant did make medical decisions because "it [did] so in the con-
text of making a determination about the availability of benefits of the plan." Id. at
1331.
Similarly, in another case, the plaintiffs, who had sought benefits under an
employee benefit plan, argued that the failure of the HMO to pay their claim
constituted a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under Texas com-
mon law. See McManus v. Travelers Health Network, 742 F. Supp. 377, 379 (W.D.
Tex. 1990). The plaintiffs further argued that their claims were based on law con-
cerning the regulation of insurance, thus falling outside the preemptive scope of
ERISA. See id. The court held that the claim was not specifically directed at the
insurance industry as a whole and, therefore, was preempted by ERISA. See id. at
380-82 (finding that plaintiff's claim was encompassed by savings clause of ERISA).
Other courts, however, have not allowed ERISA to preempt certain state law
claims. In Pickett, the plaintiff sued three physicians for negligently failing to diag-
nose her cancer. Pickett, 742 F. Supp. at 947. The HMO argued for removal to
federal court, claiming that the plaintiff was challenging administration of the
plan. See id. The federal court remanded the case to the state level because the
plaintiffs claim was a common law medical malpractice case and not one of claims
administration. See id. But see Ricci, 840 F. Supp. at 318 (holding that ERISA pre-
empted state law claim of vicarious liability because alleged malpractice ultimately
depended on relationship between physician and administrative plan under which
physician functioned).
Courts concluding that ERISA preempts state medical malpractice claims have
done so by strictly adhering to a line of Supreme Court cases that interpret ERISA
expansively. See Coan, supra note 48, at 1025 (discussing Supreme Court prece-
dent that guided lower court in concluding that ERISA preempts state medical
malpractice claims). In Pilot Life Insurance, the Supreme Court addressed the pre-
emption of state common law claims for the first time. Pilot Life Insurance, 481 U.S.
at 1048 (noting that Supreme Court had never decided whether ERISA preempts
state common law claims). The Court noted the expansive sweep of the preemp-
tion clause and concluded that a state law relates to a benefit plan if it has a con-
nection with or reference to such a plan. See id. at 104748 (holding that because
employee's claims "relate to" employee's benefit plan, such claims must fall under
ERISA's preemption clause).
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The type of recovery sought is based on negligence attributable
to the delay occasioned by a cost containment protocol set by a
for-profit organization, and which is aimed at conserving and in-
creasing its profits, an intention diametrically opposed to ER-
ISA's general purpose of protecting the rights of a plan's
beneficiaries .... To find that such claims are preempted be-
cause they may interfere with what is in essence a business deci-
sion made in the financial interests of a commercial entity is
inconsistent with the intention of ERISA and should not "suffice
to trigger preemption."
50
Allowing ERISA to preclude tort suits against HMOs allows ERISA to
serve as a shield for negligent practice and leaves the employee virtually
defenseless. 5 1 Leaving the worker without remedy allows the HMO to pur-
sue its financial goals unchecked by any concern with accountability.
52
50. Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711, 716 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (citation omit-
ted). In Pappas, the plaintiff, a subscriber to an HMO, complained to his doctor of
neck and shoulder pain. See id. at 713. Despite treatment with steroids, the plain-
tiff's condition worsened significantly, and he complained of numbness through-
out most of his body and became unable to walk. See id. The plaintiff was admitted
to a local hospital where he was diagnosed with an epidural abscess that was com-
pressing his spinal cord. See id. Plaintiff required immediate treatment at a hospi-
tal with more extensive facilities than those available at the local hospital. See id.
Without immediate treatment, plaintiffs condition would worsen or become per-
manent. See id.
Plaintiff's doctors made numerous attempts to transfer the plaintiff to an ap-
proved facility. See id. Despite the pressing nature of the emergency, plaintiff's
HMO significantly delayed approving plaintiff's removal to an authorized hospital.
See id. After three hours of delays, plaintiff was transported to an authorized facil-
ity. See id. Plaintiff ultimately ended up with permanent quadriplegia. See id.
Plaintiff brought suit against his primary care physician for malpractice and
against the local hospital, alleging that it was negligent in causing delay in transfer-
ring him to a suitable facility. See id. The hospital brought a third-party claim
against the HMO, alleging that the HMO was negligent in refusing to authorize
the transfer. See id. at 714. The HMO successfully filed a motion for summary
judgment alleging that the third-party complaint should be dismissed because it
was preempted by section 1144(a) of ERISA. See id. The Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania reversed the decision of the Court of Common Pleas and held that ERISA
did not preempt the action because the negligence claim at issue had no connec-
tion to the benefit scheme that Congress sought to protect through ERISA. See id.
at 717 (stating that there is "no connection to the benefit scheme which Congress
sought to protect by preempting laws tending to produce conflicting systemic de-
mands; ERISA is in no way implicated by the claim that [the HMO] negligently
caused [plaintiff's] injuries by its delay in authorizing his transfer").
51. Remedies under ERISA are impractical and even more time consuming
than tort suits. It is not coincidental that the HMOs argue for ERISA preemption.
52. In essence, ERISA can deny a cause of action for medical malpractice,
leaving plaintiffs with no way of recovering for the acts of negligent parties. See
Coan, supra note 48, at 1026 (explaining how "preemption effectively denies a mal-
practice action"). To further confound the issue, Congress has not replaced pre-
empted state laws with substantive federal legislation. See LarryJ. Pittman, ERISA's
Preemption Clause and the Health Care Industry: An Abdication ofJudicial Law-Creating
Authority, 46 U. FLA. L. REv. 355, 436-40 (1994) (discussing why courts should cre-
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C. Immunity
When HMOs were first being developed, some states wished to en-
courage them and for that reason gave them the shield of immunity from
negligence suit.53 Although this may have helped the trend toward cost
cutting, a trend in which the state governments wished to participate, it
left HMOs free to develop without the restraints that the threat of liability
in tort would have brought with it. Although immunity might at one time
have been justifiable, HMOs have arrived on the scene and no longer
need immunity to protect them. They should be responsible for their acts.
The modern trend has been to eliminate immunities in favor of ap-
plying the same standards to all entities.54 There is no reason why this
trend should not include HMOs in those jurisdictions which granted im-
munity in the first place. HMOs, like other entities, should be held ac-
countable for their decisions, and can purchase insurance to protect
themselves when they are sued.
D. Rationing
Strictly speaking, rationing is not really a legal concept applicable (or
not applicable) to HMOs. HMOs were a response to a perceived need to
cut costs. Rationing is another such response. To a certain extent, HMOs
serve as a rationing device, because they restrict access to services. 55 Ra-
tioning occurs when policy decisions are made to deny treatment in cer-
tain circumstances. 56 Rationing may be utilized to curtail the extent of
ate federal substantive law to provide relief for injured individuals who have been
denied causes of action through ERISA).
53. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2J-25(c)-(d) (West 1996) (providing that author-
ized HMOs "shall not be deemed to be practicing medicine" and that "no person
participating in the arrangements of [an HMO] other than the actual provider of
health care .. .shall be liable for negligence, misfeasance, nonfeasance or mal-
practice in connection with the furnishings of such services"); see also Harrell v.
Total Health Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Mo. 1989) (shielding HMO from liabil-
ity in negligence action under Missouri statute that exempts health service organi-
zation from liability for injuries resulting from negligence).
54. For example, many states have elected to abolish charitable immunity.
See, e.g., Albritton v. Neighborhood Ctrs. Ass'n for Child Dev., 466 N.E.2d 867, 871
(Ohio 1984) (abolishing charitable immunity doctrine in Ohio and subjecting
charitable organizations to liability in tort to same extent as individuals and corpo-
rations). One of the reasons for this action is that charities, like all other entities,
should be responsible for their acts, and tort law is the primary means of enforcing
this. See id. at 870 ("[A] personal injury is no less painful, disabling, costly, or
damage producing simply because it was inflicted by a charitable institution rather
than by any other party or entity.").
55. Of course, if one can pay for the services denied by the HMO, one can
receive them.
56. See FuRRow ET AL., supra note 12, at 297 (distinguishing rationing from
allocation). Professor Furrow states that
[t]hrough allocation decisions a society determines how much of its re-
sources to devote to a particular purpose (for example, how much to allo-
cate to Medicare, or to the End Stage Renal Dialysis Program, or to
[Vol. 43: p. 321
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services, for example at the end of life ("no respirators will be available to
persons over the age of ninety"). Rationing may also be used to make
decisions about substantive procedures, such as kidney transplants ("no
transplants to persons over sixty-five").57 If there were sufficient resources
to pay for the maximum treatment for all members of society, rationing
would not be necessary in the former situation. The latter situation repre-
sents a mixed decision to deny a scarce resource (an organ for transplant)
to a group that "wastes" both the organ and the resources expended in the
transplant process, in comparison to other possible recipients. 58 What
makes the rationing decision to deny a kidney to a person over sixty-five
years old a fair one is that the decision is not made about a particular
individual, nor is a comparison between two individual recipients made.
Rationing also occurs, however, when a decision is made as to which
among a group of possible recipients should receive an organ.59 As with
age limits, consistency of criteria is vital in this context.
When consciously and deliberately done, a fair rationing system ex-
tends scarce resources to those who can most profit from their availabil-
ity. 60 In the medical context, a fair rationing system requires that a
transplantation of hearts). Through rationing, a society decides who gets
the resources allocated in a particular way; which individual gets the dialy-
sis or the heart. Obviously, allocation decisions affect rationing decisions:
the more resources allocated in a particular purpose, the fewer difficult
rationing decisions need be made as to who gets the resources. Perhaps
less obviously, rationing decisions affect allocation decisions; the more
poignant rationing decisions become, the more likely is a society to allo-
cate enough resources to avoid uncomfortable rationing decisions.
Id.
57. See Gumo CraLBRESI & PHILIP BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 186-89 (1978) (dis-
cussing procedures by which artificial kidneys and transplants have been allocated
in United States); Arthur L. Caplan, Organ Transplant: The Costs of Success, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1983, at 23-32 (same).
58. See Editorial, Organ Shortage: Rationing Policy Assures New Livers for Patients
Most Likely to Survive, HARRISBURG PATRIOT & EVENING NEWS, Nov. 26, 1996, at A8
[hereinafter Organ Shortage] (discussing new rationing policy in which patients
awaiting liver transplants who have best chance of surviving receive top priority).
59. See id. (discussing medical rationing in context of liver transplants). The
determination as to which member of a group of possible recipients will receive a
transplant is made through rationing:
The recent change in the policy used to determine which patients await-
ing a liver transplant go to the top of the list has been described as "a case
study of [medical) rationing."
Dr. Arthur Caplan, director of the Center for Bioethics at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, sees broader implications in the decision by the
United Network for Organ Sharing to give priority in liver transplants to
the sickest patients with the best prospect of surviving. He views it as a
test case for medical rationing in general, "a canary in a mine that all of
us will have to enter."
Id.
60. See CALABRESI & BOBBIT, supra note 57, at 31-50, 83-127 (discussing various
allocation and rationing methods); FuRRow ET AL., supra note 12, at 297-300
(same). Although rationing sounds straightforward, it is in fact extremely difficult
to carry out in any visible manner. One reason why rationing on the basis of
1998]
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decision as to who receives a particular service be made on a fair and uni-
formly applied set of criteria. 61 Thus, the most appropriate (fair) ration-
ing occurs when responsible decision makers, after scientific study,
develop standards and rules that will insure that the resources reach their
appropriate recipients. 62 Unfair rationing occurs when no one is willing
to make the hard decisions. 63 When this happens, resources are allocated
unsystematically and by default, in a manner based on criteria that have
nothing to do with sound medical practice and statistics. The primary de-
fault criterion is wealth.
64
Scarce resources remain scarce, whether explicit rationing decisions
are made or not. When rationing decisions are not explicitly made, the
market tends to determine the identity of recipients, and the scarce re-
wealth has continued to exist may well be that it is largely invisible, and not the
product of public and openly made decisions.
When the individual who is denied a service becomes a real, live, visible being
who is facing death, adherence to rationing may be impossible. See id. at 297-99
(arguing that society is more likely to expend vast amounts of resources to save
lives of persons who are real and identifiable, and far less willing to spend such
resources in saving lives of persons whom society does not see). There is also a
distinction to be made between statistical and identifiable lives. In general, it is
more likely that society will expend a huge amount of resources to save an identifi-
able life, while statistical lives will be sacrificed at a much lower cost. The distinc-
tions between allocation and rationing and between identifiable and statistical lives
are intertwined; allocation decisions usually affect statistical lives, while rationing
affects identifiable lives. See id. at 297.
61. See Organ Shortage, supra note 58, at A8 ("The test for acceptable rationing
is that it be, and be seen to be, fair and equitable."); see also CALABREsi & BOBBIT,
supra note 57, at 187-88 (discussing inadequacies of rationing systems in which
rationing decisions were made "mindlessly," without regard to fair and uniform
criteria).
62. See Douglas J. Besharov & Jessica Dunsay Silver, Rationing Access to Ad-
vanced Medical Techniques, 8J. LEGAL MED. 507, 520 (1987) (arguing that once it is
concluded that rationing is necessary, reliance on medical criteria is most rational
approach because patients for treatment are selected according to who can benefit
most from such treatment). But see David Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability: Ra-
tioning of Helath Care and Unfair Discrimination Against the Sick, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 49, 73 (1996) (arguing that random selection and lotteries should be used to
ration health care). It has been argued that medical professionals should not be
responsible for rationing decisions. See Orentlicher, supra note 23, at 166-67 (set-
ting forth arguments as to why physicians should not engage in rationing
decisions).
63. See CALABRESi & BOBBIT, supra note 57, at 186-91 (discussing how society
dodges value-laden questions); FuRROW ET AL., supra note 12, at 299 (stating that
decision in United States to allocate sufficient resources for renal dialysis treat-
ment was made to avoid any rationing decisions).
64. See Orentlicher, supra note 62, at 52 (noting that our society presently
rations availability of health care based on wealth). Thirty-five of 52 state-adminis-
tered acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) programs have had to make
some kind of emergency move in the past year to curtail the expenditure of funds
for new drugs. See Daniel Pedersen & Eric Larson, Too Poor to Treat, NEWSwEEK, July
28, 1997, at 60 (discussing curtailment of state AIDS programs because of inade-
quate funding). Of course, those with independent resources will be able to afford
such drugs.
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sources tend to go to those who can afford them.6 5 In our society, such
rationing should be viewed with repugnance. In the past, when such ra-
tioning has come to public attention, the response has been one of horri-
fied shock. 66 For example, the federal government decided to pay for all
kidney dialysis rather than have dialysis available only to those who could
afford it.
67
Rationing on the basis of wealth has been allowed to proceed rela-
tively unchecked, at least in part because no one has proved able to take
on the task of explicitly rationing the resources at issue. It is also worth
noting that those who have the greatest political power in our society are
perfectly happy with a wealth-based system, because those with the greatest
access to medical resources can only stand to lose when rationing based on
other criteria comes into play.68 HMOs, of course, are part of wealth-
65. See FuRROW ET AL., supra note 12, at 298 (stating that unless market is used
to allocate and ration resources, resources move only to those with wealth). The
authors state that the problem with the market approach is that it can only move
valued resources to members of society who already have resources. See id. Such
allocations are inherently troubling, because they deny the equality of individuals.
66. See CALABREsi & BOBBIT, supra note 57, at 33 (" [W] hen tragic choices are
made through the pure market within an existing distribution of wealth ... it
presents the wrenching spectacle of a rich man and a poor man bidding against
each other for life."); Caplan, supra note 57, ("Historically, our society has been
reluctant to withhold life-saving medical treatments on the basis of an inability to
pay."); Lisa B. Deutch, Medicaid Payment for Organ Transplants: The Extent of Man-
dated Coverage, 30 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 185, 199-201 (1996) (noting that lan-
guage of Medicaid act provides that medical treatment be given to poor persons);
Maxwell J. Mehlman, Rationing Expensive Lifesaving Medical Treatments, 1985 Wisc.
L. REv. 239, 263-64 (1985) (stating that strong popular bias against allocating
health resources on basis of wealth exists in part because "wealth is not even a
crude measure of moral desert; the saintly are not likely to be rich, and philanthro-
pists score high on virtue because of what they have given away not because of what
they have kept"); Shana Alexander, They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies, LIFE, Nov. 15,
1962, at 124-25 (discussing society's shock in response to decisions made by com-
mittee composed primarily of lay persons who decided which persons would re-
ceive life-saving medical procedures and which persons would not).
67. See Mehlman, supra note 66, at 263-64 (discussing federal law which en-
able most patient with end-stage renal disease to have most of their hemodialysis
treatment costs paid by Medicare). The decision that the federal government
should fund all dialysis may be contrasted with the Medicare refusal to fund
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) treatment. See Pedersen & Larson, supra
note 64, at 60 (reporting how lack of federal money prompted many states to cut
off funding for AIDS treatment). The kidney dialysis decision was made in the era
when decision makers thought that full funding of all needed medical treatment
for all persons was possible. See Mehlman, supra note 66, at 248 n.42 (noting that
kidney dialysis decision was made in 1972 and that this decision extended coverage
of Social Security to persons under age 65 who had end stage renal disease). The
HIV decision was made more recently. See Pedersen & Larson, supra note 64, at 60
(discussing how state governments in 1997 are struggling to find enough money to
fund AIDS treatment programs).
68. See generally Orentlicher, supra note 62, at 73-75 (focusing on how society
can ration health care in way that does not discriminate unfairly on basis of sick-
ness). The author further points out that "[i]n the coming years, health care ra-
tioning will become increasingly common. Because of their substantial health care
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based rationing, because those with the financial resources to pay for the
freedom to choose doctors and procedures will continue to do so.
In the health care context in this country, the idea of rationing tends
to appall the public.6 9 Yet rationing exists; its existence follows from the
fact that governments and insurers, including HMOs, have become unwill-
ing to provide limitless medical care to those they insure.70 If one is
wealthy, limitless care remains accessible. If one is not, it does not.
V. THE CURE
The problem of HMO accountability has recently come to the atten-
tion of the states and courts, as well as to participants in HMO plans. In
the absence of any threat of liability, HMOs, like any other entity, have put
their own financial welfare first. They clearly face a conflict of interest
between profit and patient, and it is not surprising that they have chosen
profit. Nor can market pressures alone cure this problem. The employers
who pay for their employees to be members of HMOs face the same eco-
nomic pressures in that, as far as those paying the fees are concerned, the
lower the fees, the better. Thus, those paying the fees have the same de-
sire to keep costs down, even at the expense of the quality of care. In any
event, market pressures have had the opportunity to fix the problem, and
have not done so.
Other entities and individuals through the ages have faced similar
conflicts. Some examples of these conflicts include the decisions facing
surgeons, who will not collect a fee unless they recommend surgery, attor-
neys, who will not collect a fee unless they litigate, and stockbrokers, who
will not make commissions unless they sell stock. These conflicts have
been dealt with in various ways. The medical and legal professions have
adopted codes of conduct that theoretically keep the exercise of profes-
sional judgment unbiased. The federal government keeps its eyes peeled
for signs of churning by stockbrokers. Significantly, however, doctors and
lawyers also run the risk of liability in tort for unnecessary surgery or legal
malpractice. If members of these honored professions need the deterrent
needs and weak political power, persons with disabilities are at high risk of bearing
more than their fair share of health care cost containment." Id. at 86.
69. See H. Gilbert Welch & Eric B. Larson, Dealing With Limited Resources: The
Oregon Decision to Curtail Funding for Organ Transplantation, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED.
171, 172 (1988) (discussing public outcry in response to Oregon's policy to discon-
tinue state funding for organ transplantation in order to extend its funding for
basic health care to include 1500 persons not previously covered). For example, in
Oregon in 1987, one child died from the inability to raise enough money for a
bone marrow transplant. See id. The public response to the child's death was so
strong that in 1990 the Oregon Legislature restored Medicaid funding for organ
transplants, funding which it had previously cut as representing a poor allocation
of limited financial resources. See FuRRow ET AL., supra note 12, at 298 (noting that
Oregon's legislature was "chastened" and restored Medicaid funding for
transplants).
70. See, e.g., Pedersen & Larson, supra note 64, at 60 (discussing curtailment of
state-administered AIDS treatment programs because of lack of sufficient funds).
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effect that tort law provides to make sure that their own interests do not
overwhelm the interests of their clients and patients, why should HMOs
not need the same threat to keep their exercise of discretion reasonable?
It may be the case that in the vast majority of situations doctors, lawyers
and HMOs act conscientiously and reasonably. The deterrent effect of
tort law is designed not for this majority, which does not need its incentive
effect to act reasonably. For those who do, however, tort law provides an
incentive for all potential defendants to act conscientiously and reasonably
all the time.
It is clear that no individual or entity can operate entirely altruisti-
cally; rather, decision makers need the threat of some form of liability or
sanction to keep their judgment pure. This fact has been recognized in
the application of tort law generally; if society did not need it, it would not
have been invented. Even charities, theoretically an embodiment of virtue
and altruism, have lost their immunity. Removing the threat of tort liabil-
ity gives any entity with a financial stake in the outcome the unbridled
discretion to reach any decision it wishes. This cannot be justified by the
history either of tort law or of humanity generally.
The problem of HMO discretion has clearly come to the attention of
society. The responses to this problem have taken various piecemeal and
ineffective forms. This Article now turns to these responses.
A. Individual Appeals
One way to approach the problem is for individual members of
HMOs to challenge the HMO decision on a particular test or procedure.
Participants in plans are asserting themselves, attempting to make the
HMOs more responsive to their needs. This process of individual chal-
lenge within the HMO structure is both time consuming and ultimately
unsatisfying, however, because it involves what may be critical delays and
leaves the final decision in the hands of the party with the greatest incen-
tive to deny the patient's requests. The patient has no weapons to use
once the arguments within the HMO structure have been made.
B. Statutes: HMOs in the Legislatures
Another way to approach the problem is through legislative action.
71
Legislative action, either taken or discussed, includes regulating the stan-
dards that the HMOs set for individual medical procedures (such as
71. The volume of legislative regulation aimed at HMOs has become enor-
mous. Most of the regulations are aimed at key areas of consumer protection such
as access to emergency care, access to specialists, quality of care, grievance proce-
dures and HMO information disclosure. See 33 States Adopt HMO Bills with Con-
sumer Protections, WASH. HEALTH WK.J.,July 29, 1996, at 1; see also FredJ. Hellinger,
The Expanding Scope of State Legislation, 276 JAMA 1065, 1065-70 (1996) (tracing
growth of three types of state laws that regulate managed care plans: direct access
laws, laws that prohibit exclusivity clauses and laws that mandate minimum lengths
of stays for deliveries).
19981
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preventing "drive-thru" deliveries and mastectomies and unduly restrictive
emergency room standards),72 regulating HMO administration (such as
preventing HMOs from creating financial incentives for nonreferral),
7 3
regulating HMO membership (such as prohibiting HMOs from rejecting
Much of the legislation being introduced is based on the AMA's Model Pa-
tient Protection Act, which first appeared in 1994. See Bruce D. Platt & Lisa D.
Stream, Dispelling the Negative Myths of Managed Care: An Analysis of Anti-Managed
Care Legislation and the Quality of Care Provided by Health Maintenance Organizations,
23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 489, 490-93 (1995) (claiming that HMOs have significantly
reduced health care costs, but noting that many interest groups have promoted
legislation that would heavily burden managed care plans by eliminating funda-
mental concepts upon which HMOs function).
In general, the legislation in question restricts managed care and gives more
power to patients and physicians. Florida's version of a patient protection act is
representative of proposals of this type across the country. See id. at 494-599 (dis-
cussing provisions of Florida's patient protection act). This act, which was not
passed by the legislature, provides that managed care plans must provide prospec-
tive enrollees with detailed information on the plan's terms, conditions and con-
tracts with its providers and seeks to increase physicians' ability to negotiate with
HMOs. See id. at 493-94 (giving details of provisions).
Texas has been aggressive in regulating HMOs. See Bass, supra note 47, at TI
(describing proposed laws by Texas Legislature as "among the most pro-patient
health-care rules in the country"). Proposals being considered or passed include
opening HMOs to greater liability in malpractice suits and placing tighter restric-
tions on financial incentives given to physicians who work for a managed care plan
and preventing many plans from signing exclusivity contracts with their doctors.
See generally id.
The AMA has been an active force in promoting managed care regulation. See
generally Steven Brostoff, AMA Backing 'Anti-HMO' Legislation, NAT'L UNDER-
WRITER-LIFE & HEALTH INS., May 30, 1994, at 1 (describing legislation regulating
managed care that is backed by AMA); John Fairhall, Clash of Titans: Doctors,
HMOs, Insurers on Health Care, BALTIMORE SUN, July 3, 1994, at El (discussing
AMA's lobbying and advertising efforts to depict managed care as undermining
medical decision making).
72. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 641.31 (31)(a) (West 1995) (forbidding HMOs
from limiting inpatient hospital care for mastectomies to period less than that de-
termined by treating physician to be medically necessary); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/
356t (West 1995 & Supp. 1997) (same); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4237 (West
1995 & Supp. 1997) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-46-41.1 (Michie 1995) (requir-
ing HMOs to provide at least 48 hours of inpatient care following mastectomy);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 6060.5.B (West 1995 & Supp. 1997) (same); see also States
Move Multiple Health Care Bill in Fledgling Legislative Session, HEALTH LEGIS. & REG,
Mar. 26, 1997, at 2 (stating that two of top four issues nationwide are legislating
mastectomy and maternity length of stay).
73. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-6 (1995) ("A managed care plan may not
use a financial incentive program that directly compensates a health care provider
for . . . providing less than medically necessary and appropriate care to . . . pa-
tients."); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-1008 (1997) (prohibiting HMOs from withhold-
ing payment based on services provided by physicians compensated on capitated
basis); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.13-3(B) (8) (1995) (prohibiting health plans from
entering agreements with physicians for payments that provide incentive to "re-
duce or limit services"); see also Tracy E. Miller, Managed Care Regulation: In the
Laboratory of the States, 278JAMA 1102, 1102-09 (1997) (discussing legislative efforts
to restrict financial incentives that can be offered to physicians to deny medically
appropriate or needed treatment).
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physician applicants on what should be inappropriate grounds such as re-
ferral rates),74 and regulating HMO rules (such as prohibiting "gag rules"
that HMOs use to prevent physicians from disclosing the limitations of the
care provided by the HMO).
75
74. See Miller, supra note 73, at 1104 (discussing AMA opposition to HMO
plans that terminate physicians based on use of economic profiles, such as physi-
cian's referral patterns); Platt & Stream, supra note 71, at 490-93 (describing any
willing provider statutes and similar prohibitions on restructuring membership);
see also Susan R. Miller, Black Doctors Say HMO Shut Them Out; Some Say the Issue Is
Simple: The Color of Their Skin, S. FLA. Bus. J. Mi, Apr. 4, 1997, at Al (describing
pending antidiscrimination legislation in Florida, in response to allegations of ra-
cial discrimination in hiring practices).
75. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-121(1)(b) (West 1995) (prohibit-
ing HMOs from terminating physicians for discussing treatment options, whether
covered by plan or not, with patients); D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-4506(h)(1) (1996)
(prohibiting HMOs from contracting with physicians to prevent physicians from
discussing treatment options not covered by plan); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-11-
4.5(a) (2) (1995) (prohibiting contracts between HMOs and physicians that disal-
low physicians from discussing treatment options not covered by plan); N.Y. PUB,
HEALTH LAw § 4406-c2(b) (McKinney 1996) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-
3407.10J (Michie 1995) (prohibiting contracts between HMOs and physicians that
forbid discussion of medical treatment options).
Antigag rule policies were adopted by 18 states in 1995 and 1996. See Miller,
supra note 73, at 1105. Another 18 states instituted such policies between January
and August 1997. See id. (noting that "18 states followed suit"). As of December
31, 1996, 13 states had adopted antigag rule policies with respect to contracts be-
tween physicians and HMOs that prohibit disclosure of plan limitations, including
California, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington and the
District of Colombia. See id.
Pending legislation in New York and New Jersey would provide some of the
most consumer-oriented protections in the United States. See Hellinger, supra
note 71, at 1068 (describing new legislation emerging in wake of public pressure,
especially in light of high-profile death in New Jersey). A New York consumer
protection bill purports to balance the concerns of patients with those of employ-
ers, HMOs and insurers. See N. Y. Consumer Protection Bill Bans Gag Clauses, Mandates
Disclosure, WASH. HEALTH WK. J., July 29, 1996, at 2 (describing New York bill that
addresses gag clauses, provider payment incentives, specialty care access and emer-
gency room coverage).
A New Jersey health care quality act would prohibit gag clauses in physician
contracts, prevent HMOs from penalizing doctors for providing necessary care to
patients, require HMOs to offer patients the option of going out of network to
seek medical care, allow an external treatment decision appeals panel to fine an
HMO up to $10,000 for engaging in a pattern of denying necessary medical care,
prohibit HMOs from ending a doctor's contract because he or she prescribed too
much care and give doctors the authority to determine what is medically necessary.
See Statelines New Jersey: Senate Approves Health Care Quality Act, AM. POL. NETWORK,
May 23, 1997, at 9.
The federal government has also been active in regulating HMOs. See Spen-
cer Rich, Managed Care, Once an Elixir, Goes Under the Legislative Knife; Cost-Cutting
Focus Feared Harmful to Patients, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1996, at Al (noting that AMA
has been pushing for federal standards). Lawmakers in Washington and in state
capitals are rethinking HMO cost-cutting emphasis. See id. (stating that legislative
initiatives have been pushed nationwide because of concern that managed care has
jeopardized patient health). For example, Congress approved legislation requir-
ing insurance companies to pay for at least 48-hour hospital stays for mothers giv-
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The legislative actions in this arena are aimed largely at individual
problems that have come to the attention of the state government through
public outcry.7 6 Examples of this include legislation to allow women to
remain in the hospital for 48 hours after childbirth77 and legislation re-
ing birth, and a bipartisan bill being considered in Congress would bar HMOs
from imposing gag rules that prevent physicians from fully informing patients
about what their medical options are and which of those options the plan will pay
for. See id. Several other bills pending in Congress address issues such as quality of
emergency hospital care provided by medical plans. See id.; see also Diane M. Gi-
anelli, Congress Considers Ban on Managed Care "Gag" Clauses, AM. MED. NEws, June
17, 1996, at 3 (discussing former AMA President Robert McAfee's testimony before
House Commerce Health Subcommittee stating that gag clauses "violate sound
public policy and should be made unenforceable and legally null and void").
76. See 33 States Adopt HMO Bills with Consumer Protections, supra note 71, at 1
(noting that during first six months of 1996, 33 states enacted consumer protec-
tion laws related to managed care and at least 1000 more were introduced); State by
State Look at HMO Regulations, GANNETTE NEWS SERV., July 23, 1996, available in
1996 WL 4381809 (listing, on state by state basis, various legislative reforms that
each state has enacted); see also Robert Pear, A Prescription for Communication; Sixteen
States Pass Laws to Prevent HMOs from Restricting What Doctors Tell Patients, RocKy
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 22, 1996, at 2B (discussing growing concern regarding ef-
forts by HMOs to limit what doctors can tell their patients).
Legislative initiatives attempting to regulate the managed care industry are a
response to concerns that cost-cutting measures by managed care organizations
are dangerous. See Steve Sakson, Out Front: Highly Criticized, HMOs Face Wave of
Restrictive Legislation, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 14, 1996, (stating that tales of shabby
hospital care and doctors opting for cheapest treatment, rather than most appro-
priate treatment, have spawned backlash legislation in at least 40 states); see also
David S. Hilzenrath, Backlash Builds Over Managed Care; Frustrated Consumers Push for
Tougher Laws, WASH. POST, June 30, 1997, at Al (discussing backlash against man-
aged care and resulting legislation).
For example, in Missouri, the governor signed a bill requiring managed care
companies to pay for emergency room visits whenever a "prudent layperson"
would have reason to believe that immediate care is needed, even if the managed
care administrator does not agree. See id. The Connecticut Legislature approved a
bill that would allow patients to appeal to the state insurance commissioner when
health plans decide not to pay for their medical treatment, and Texas has removed
a barrier that had formerly prevented consumers from suing HMOs for medical
malpractice. See id. A budget bill passed by the House of Representatives would
require Medicare HMOs to defer to doctors on key decisions about coverage, and
nine states have ordered coverage of hospital stays for mastectomies. See id. (listing
states). At least 23 states require that HMOs allow women some measure of guar-
anteed access to obstetrics and gynecology (OB/GYN) care instead of leaving the
decision to gatekeeper physicians. See id. New York has ordered HMOs to allow
specialists to serve as primary doctors for patients with life-threatening, degenera-
tive or disabling conditions, and 16 states have enacted requirements involving
coverage of emergency services, many similar to Missouri's "prudent layperson"
rule. See id. The District of Columbia and 34 states have outlawed gag clauses. See
id. At the federal level, the movement to increase regulation of managed care is
gathering momentum as typified by a number of bills that would impose new re-
quirements in federal health insurance programs, including a version of the "pru-
dent layperson" rule for emergency services. See id.
77. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2912.01 (West 1995) (preventing
health care group contracts from restricting benefits for child birth hospital stays
to less than 48 hours following normal delivery); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-
2,160(a) (2) (b) (1996) (requiring all health plans to provide coverage for at least
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quiring that an HMO pay for emergency room visits whenever a "prudent
lay person" would have gone to an emergency room.78 Some of the stat-
utes restore a reasonableness standard with respect to the specific situa-
tions with which they deal. 79 Some set specific standards, no more flexible
than those the HMO would have set, albeit more generous to the pa-
tient.8 0 Some states have elected to regulate HMOs in an effort to prevent
their profit motive from affecting their judgment. These statutes include
laws forbidding HMOs from penalizing gatekeeper doctors for referring
their patients to specialists or for testing and laws forbidding the creation
of incentives to accomplish the same result.
Individual laws directed at individual procedures and forms of HMO
conduct are highly inefficient as a solution to the problem posed.8 ' The
problem is a general one of HMO focus, not one with policies on deliver-
ing babies or preventing patients from finding out that a better, more ex-
pensive treatment might give them a better chance at a cure. There are
close to an infinite number of treatments and protocols, and legislatures
cannot deal with them individually. Indeed, to think that legislatures
should proceed through the panoply of medical procedures, enacting a
48 hours of inpatient care following child birth); MASS GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 176G,
§ 41 (West 1996) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27A-7.la (West 1996) (same).
78. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-309(c) (1) (Michie Supp. 1995) (defining
emergency services with respect to a "prudent lay person"); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-
20A-3(2) (1981) (same); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. II § 19-701(d) (1996)
(same); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-4300 (Michie 1996).
79. For a discussion of the "prudent lay person" standard and standards legis-
lated by other states, see Diane E. Hoffmann, Emergency Care and Managed Care-A
Dangerous Combination, 72 WASH. L. Rzv. 315, 368-73 (1997).
80. See Hilzenrath, supra note 76, at Al (stating that Missouri law requires
HMO coverage of emergency charges under "prudent layperson" standard); Rich,
supra note 75, at Al (discussing legislation that requires 48-hour stay for mothers
giving birth); Andy Miller, Bills Regulating HMOs on Tap for Legislature: Backers Say
Patients Deserve More Information, ATLANTA J., Jan. 9, 1997, at E01 (describing new
federal rule that would prohibit financial incentives for cost cutting); see also Laura
H. Harshbaiger, ERISA Preemption Meets the Age of Managed Care: Toward a Compre-
hensive Social Policy, 47 SYRACUSE L. REv. 191, 217 (1996) (describing danger that
"Congress likely never considered managed care issues at all" in enacting ERISA);
Debra E. Kuper, Newborn's and Mother's Health Protection Act: Putting the Brakes on
Drive-Through Deliveries, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 657, 680 (1997) ("[D]ispensing medical
advice is out of bounds for a... legislature."). See generally Richard Frank, Regula-
tory Responses to Information Deficiencies in the Market for Member Health Services, in THE
FUTURE OF MEMBER HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 113 (1989) ("[S]everal state legisla-
tures have extended mandates on mental health benefits to HMOs.").
81. See Miller, supra note 73, at 1102 (discussing ineffectiveness of legislation
directed at individual procedures, such as granting right to inpatient care follow-
ing mastectomy or child birth). One commentator suggests that
[l]ike state legislation granting the right to inpatient care following mas-
tectomy, the maternity stay laws suggest a treatment-by-treatment ap-
proach that is clinically specific and inherently limited in impact.
Although less publicized, regulatory initiatives in many states have been
designed more broadly to promote ... patient rights ....
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statute about each one, is ridiculous. Not only are there too many to con-
front, but the standards of care change. A statute might require a four-day
stay for the removal of a gallbladder, for example. With the invention of
laparoscopic surgery for gallbladders, such removal has become an over-
night procedure. Or a statute might require that a patient receive an
X ray in certain circumstances and itself require that the hospital act negli-
gently, because more sophisticated machinery has become available.
Would the legislature amend its statutes every time medical practice
changes?
Statutes directed at individual procedures are also unsatisfactory be-
cause they only deal with those few procedures that happen to provoke
public outrage, although there are many more that should do so, but that
never enter the public eye. The fact that a particular HMO standard has
received public attention should not be the sole factor in the medical deci-
sion-making process.
Moreover, if the primary evil of HMOs involves medical decision mak-
ing by nonmedical or nontreating personnel, legislation oriented towards
specific procedures suffers from the same infirmity. Surely doctors should
be making the decisions, not the HMO or the legislature. Individual laws
replace medical judgment with legislative judgment, surely not a result
that will ultimately help anyone.
If there is a simple solution to this problem that would eliminate the
need for all this legislative activity, that solution should be adopted. If
there are two ways to accomplish a goal, one of which is simple, flexible
and straightforward, and the other of which is complex, inappropriate and
convoluted, the simple solution is bound to be more effective.
Many of the laws mentioned above have been enacted in an effort to
allow the physician's best medical judgment to prevail over the HMO's
desire to cut costs. There is a much easier way to reach this result, how-
ever. Holding HMOs liable for negligence when they attempt to foreclose
the doctor from exercising his or her judgment accomplishes precisely the
same goal, without all the legislative activity.8 2
82. There are those who might argue that holding HMOs to a reasonableness
standard would release a flood of litigation. One response to this assertion is that
there already is a flood, of both litigation and legislative activity. In any event,
litigation directed against managed care organizations is already on the rise. See
Louise Kertesz, Data Signal Managed Care Suits on the Rise, MOD. HEALTHCARE, May
20, 1996, at 17 ("Five years' worth of claims data from Farmers Insurance Group
support the belief of some healthcare attorneys that claims and lawsuits alleging
negligence under managed care are growing."). Patients are increasingly willing
to challenge HMOs in court. See Edward Felsenthal, When HMOs Say No to Coverage,
More Patients Are Taking Them to Court, WALL ST.J., May 17, 1996, at B1 (stating that
more people are suing HMOs when they receive what they consider inadequate
care and that "some patients are going straight to a lawyer as soon as coverage for
routine care is denied").
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C. The Piecemeal, Common Law Approach
In the absence of a uniform negligence standard, courts have strug-
gled to use the common law to reach appropriate results in individual
cases.8 3 The doctrine of respondeat superior, pursuant to which the em-
ployer is liable for an employee's negligence, has supplied a basis for liabil-
ity, but has not always been successful in the face of arguments by the
HMOs that the doctors, and not the HMO, made the challenged deci-
sions. 84 Respondeat superior doctrine, moreover, holds the HMO liable
83. HMOs are being exposed to litigation under various theories of liability
including vicarious liability (respondeat superior and ostensible agency), direct
corporate liability (negligent selection/supervision and utilization management),
breach of warranty, breach of contract, misrepresentation/false advertising and
bad faith. There-has also been a substantial amount of litigation revolving around
ERISA preemption. See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 48, at 337-46 (discussing
various theories of liability); Helene L. Parise, Comment, The Proper Extension of
Tort Liability Principles in the Managed Care Industry, 64 TEMP. L. Riv. 977, 996-98
(1991) (discussing various forms of derivative theories of liability, including re-
spondeat superior).
84. Under respondeat superior, the HMO is liable for the negligence of its
employees, the doctors. See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 48, at 300 ("In order
for an HMO to be vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an
employer-employee relationship or a closely analogous relationship between the
HMO and the physician must be found.").
Case law regarding HMOs and the doctrine of respondeat superior indicates
that the relationship of the HMO to the physician is indeed a critical factor. See
Fredman v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Colo., 849 P.2d 811, 816 (Colo. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that patients could not proceed under respondeat superior be-
cause HMO was statutorily precluded from directing or controlling independent
contractors); Raglin v. HMO Ill., Inc., 595 N.E.2d 153, 156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(finding HMO not liable under respondeat superior for actions of independent
contractors); Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council of Indianapolis, Inc., 516
N.E.2d 1104,1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (finding nature of employer-employee rela-
tionship critical in establishing liability under doctrine of respondeat superior);
Chase v. Independent Practice Ass'n, 583 N.E.2d 251, 254 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991)
(stating that test of vicarious liability for physician negligence is control or right of
control by HMO); Williams v. Good Health Plus, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 373, 379 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987) (finding HMO not liable for faulty prescription under theories of
respondeat superior or ostensible agency). The case law sometimes also reflects a
failure to take into account the control that the HMO may in fact be exercising
over the doctors in the plan.
In one case, an HMO was found vicariously liable for the negligence of its
consulting physician, despite an HMO argument that the physician was an in-
dependent contractor. See Schleier v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Mid-
Atlantic States, 876 F.2d 174, 177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The court held that the
HMO had some ability to control the behavior of the consulting physician because
the physician answered to the patient's primary care-taker, an HMO doctor, and it
appeared that the physician's actions in performing the health care fell within the
HMO's regular business. See id.
Similarly, in Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, the appellate court reversed
the finding of the trial court and found the HMO liable under the theory of re-
spondeat superior for the negligent acts of a member physician. Sloan, 516 N.E.2d
at 1109 ("We see no reason why [an HMO] should be exempt from the doctrine of
respondeat superior while professional corporations are not."). The appellate
court pointed out that the physician providing treatment was engaged by the
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only for physician negligence, and does not allow a direct challenge to
HMO conduct. To serve the goal of insuring appropriate HMO conduct,
respondeat superior doctrine in this context would require the conclusion
that doctors who obey their HMO's strictures against their own better
judgment may be negligent for doing so. A much more direct way to ac-
complish this result-and one that does less damage to the physicians
who, by hypothesis, are not really at fault-would be to allow suits directly
based upon HMO decision making.
Another theory of liability closely related to respondeat superior is
that of ostensible agency.8 5 Under ostensible agency, an HMO is liable for
physician negligence when the patient reasonably believes that the physi-
cian is the agent of the HMO.8 6 This theory suffers from the same infirmi-
HMO under a written employment contract and that an employment relationship
thus existed. See id.
Finally, in a New Jersey case, the court determined that an HMO can be held
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862,
869 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (stating that physician was direct employee of
HMO because he performed services at HMO offices for payment based on HMO
subscribers, and thus, HMO may be liable under doctrine of respondeat superior),
rev'd on other grounds, 656 A.2d 413 (NJ. 1995). The court also found that the
HMO could be held liable under an agency theory. See id. at 868 (finding that
physician was not acting as independent contractor for HMO, but rather as agent
of HMO). Because of the control that the HMO was able to exercise under this
relationship, the physician was found to be an ostensible agent of the HMO. See id.
at 868 n.4 (listing factors showing control exercised by HMO, such as physician's
inability to accept or reject particular patients and referrals solely at HMO's
option).
85. Ostensible agency is defined in the Restatement (Second) of Agency as:
One who represents that another is his [or her] servant or other agent
and thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill
of such apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm
caused by the lack of care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or
other agent as if he [or her] were such.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or AGENCY § 267 (1957); see Bearden & Maedgen, supra
note 48, at 309 (defining ostensible agency theory in context of vicarious liability).
86. See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 48, at 310 ("If the patient justifiably
relies on the skill of the physician in the belief that an agency exists, the HMO may
be vicariously liable as if actual agency existed."). Under ostensible agency, an
HMO can be held liable for physician negligence when appearances have led a
patient reasonably to believe that a physician or health care provider was in the
employ of the HMO. See Earlene P. Weiner, Managed Health Care: HMO Corporate
Liability, Independent Contractors, and the Ostensible Agency Doctrine, 15J. CORP. L. 535,
564 (1990) ("[P]laintiffs must prove reliance on the HMO's misrepresentation of
its independent contractor-physicians as employees."); see also Karsten v. Kaiser
Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1253, 1258 (E.D. Va.
1992) (holding HMO liable as tortfeasor in member's action against HMO for
negligent care and treatment); Elsesser v. Hospital of Phila. College of Osteo-
pathic Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that HMO may be
liable for negligence of independent contractor if provider is ostensible agent).
In one case, the court reversed a grant of summary judgement for an HMO
under what appears to be a combination of ostensible agency theory and direct
liability for negligence. See Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1235
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (stating that issue of material fact existed as to whether par-
ticipating physicians were ostensible agents of HMO). In Boyd, the court ruled that
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ties as respondeat superior generally. Unless a doctor who disobeys HMO
directions is negligent, ostensible agency cannot get at the source of the
problem.
87
In response to the perceived inadequacies of respondeat superior and
ostensible agency liability as applied to hospitals, courts developed the the-
ory of corporate liability.8 8 Under this doctrine, hospitals could be held
liable for failing to make sure that the doctors practicing within their walls
were competent.89 Under this theory, HMOs have a direct duty to supply
adequate health care to their patients. 90 This source of obligation has met
with mixed success in the courts, particularly because the HMO may have
the HMO could be negligent in failing to oversee physicians and hospitals that
appeared and acted as agents of the HMO. Id. at 1234-35. Similarly, in another
case, an HMO was found vicariously liable under the ostensible agency doctrine
for representing that its primary care physicians were carefully screened and fully
qualified. See McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org., 604 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992) (finding that primary care physician was held out as agent of
HMO). This representation was inaccurate. See id. As in Boyd, this ruling appears
to be a mixture of vicarious and direct liability.
Conversely, in Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc., the court rejected the theory of
ostensible agency because quality assessment and utilization review guidelines were
not the type of control that implies that an agency relationship exists. Raglin, 595
N.E.2d at 158 (finding HMO's administrative role in overseeing health care deliv-
ery, rather than addressing accuracy of medical diagnoses or opinions and deter-
mining appropriateness of medical services delivered, did not constitute control
necessary to impute agency relationship). Similarly, in Chase, the court ruled that
the HMO did not control the activities of the negligent physician and that the
plaintiff had failed to show any reliance that would make the doctrine of ostensible
agency applicable. Chase, 583 N.E.2d at 254-55.
87. See Weiner, supra note 86, at 546 (explaining that doctine of ostensible
agency holds HMOs liable when HMOs create appearance that agency relationship
exists between HMO and negligent physician); see also James B. Cohoon, Com-
ment, Piercing the Doctrine of Corporate Hospital Liablity, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 383,
383 ("According to the doctrine of corporate hospital liability, hospitals may be
held liable for the negligent conduct of their ...autonomous staff physicians."
(emphasis added)).
88. Under a theory of corporate liability, liability does not depend upon a
particular relationship between an entity, such as a hospital or HMO, and the phy-
sician. See Alan D. Allred & Terry D. Tottenham, Liability and Indemnity Issues for
Integrated Delivery Systems, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 457, 458 (1996). Rather, this liability
arises "from a hospital's responsibility to the general public to meet a standard of
care." Id.
89. See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 48, at 321 (stating that "doctrine is
based on belief that hospitals should play a greater role in controlling the quality
of care provided to patients by determining that their medical staff members are
qualified and competent"). Corporate liability imposes a duty on hospitals to se-
lect and retain only competent physicians, oversee patient care administered by all
physicians practicing in the hospital and develop adequate rules and policies to
ensure quality care for patients. See Allred & Tottenham, supra note 88, at 458
(citing Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. 1991)).
90. See Allred & Tottenham, supra note 88, at 458. Although the doctrine was
originally applied to hospitals, courts have since extended its scope to include
HMOs. See id. (stating that liability based on corporate negligence, such as negli-
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some kind of immunity from suit.91 Moreover, this theory cannot reliably
supply a basis for liability when the challenge is not to the quality of the
doctor, but rather to the quality of the HMO.92 Corporate negligence
doctrine requires an underlying act of negligent medical practice to trig-
ger hospital liability. When the HMO policy has been followed by the phy-
sician, that physician has not been negligent (unless, of course, adhering
to HMO policy is declared to be negligent).
Breach of contract or warranty theories sometimes appear in response
to HMO conduct, 93 as do claims that the HMO has engaged in fraudulent
In McClellan, the court ruled that HMOs have a nondelegable duty to select
and retain competent primary care physicians. See McClellan, 604 A.2d at 1059
(finding HMO duty to select and retain only competent primary care physicians
arising out of action under section 323 of Restatement (Second) of Torts). The McClel-
lan court relied heavily on section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services
to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of
the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of
harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon
the undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
Direct corporate liability can also exist in the arena of utilization review and
management. See generally Allred & Tottenham, supra note 88, at 462 ("[A] man-
aged care entity performing utilization review could be liable for complications
suffered by the patient."). Utilization review is a cost containment and quality in-
surance strategy utilized to promote cost control efforts and efficiency. See Cher-
alyn E. Schessler, Comment, Liability Implications of Utilization Review as a Cost
Containment Mechanism, 8J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 379, 380 (1992).
The seminal case in this area is Wickline v. California, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Ct.
App.), vacated, 727 P.2d 753 (Cal. 1986). In Wickline, although the court did not
hold the third-party payor liable, it did forecast the potential for liability of parties
involved in cost containment and utilization review programs. See id. at 670. Spe-
cifically, the court held that payors could be held liable when a questionable medi-
cal decision results from "defects in the design or implementation of cost
containment mechanisms." Id.
91. For example, in one case, the court refused to discuss the merits of a
claim under direct corporate liability for the negligent selection of a surgical spe-
cialist. See Harrell v. Total Health Care, 781 S.W.2d 58, 59-60 (Mo. 1989). Instead,
the Missouri Supreme Court held that a Missouri state statute granted immunity to
HMOs for this type of liability. See id. at 60.
92. See, e.g., Jass v. Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1488-89 (7th Cir.
1996) (dismissing claim against ERISA plan administrator for breach of duty to
manage, control and determine medical care).
93. See American Health Care Providers, Inc. v. O'Brien, 886 S.W.2d 588, 591
(Ark. 1994) (holding that insured failed to establish that HMO breached contract
by not paying bills); Hughley v. Rocky Mountain Health Maintenance Org., Inc.,
910 P.2d 30, 34 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that insured's tort claims against
HMO were subject to arbitration provision of contract when based on HMO's de-
nial of benefits); Pasteur Health Plan, Inc. v. Salazar, 658 So.2d 543, 544 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. 1995) (holding that HMO insurance plan is contract of adhesion); Dunn v.
Praiss, 656 A.2d 413, 421 (N.J. 1995) (holding that physician who was found liable
for malpractice could not assert claim for contribution against HMO based on
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conduct.94 An HMO would hardly want to argue, however, that fraud and
bad faith doctrines should take on the role that negligence theory was
designed to play. This would lead inevitably to a drastic expansion of what
the courts would consider to be fraud or bad faith and increased exposure
to punitive damages.
D. The Scalpel
The various statutory and common law responses to the problem of
HMO discretion share a common thread. They all seek to focus HMO
attention on the patient, not on the HMO's bottom line. They are all
underinclusive, in that they apply to certain isolated manifestations of the
problem. They all exist in response to what has proven to be the mistake
of exempting HMOs from the normal operation of negligence principles.
The simplest answer must be elimination of the exemption. The usual
rule of accountability was altered for HMOs as an experiment. The very
volume of activity in this area proves that the experiment has failed. This
failure has been recognized in the staggering amount of legislative and
judicial effort expended in an effort to insure HMO responsibility. That
effort, however, has been oriented toward smoothing the individual
bumps in the carpet of accountability, one at a time. Surely it would be
more effective and efficient to smooth out the entire carpet, all at once.
breach of contract because plaintiffs claim against HMO was based on theory of
respondeat superior or agency).
As a profit-driven entity, HMOs employ aggressive marketing tactics to obtain
new subscribers and keep existing subscribers. See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note
48, at 330 (explaining breach of warranty theory as applied to HMOs). " 'State-
ments in the subscriber contract[s] or in promotional materials may [expose] the
HMO to claims that the HMO breached its warranty to the ... subscriber."' Id.
(quoting DavidJ. Oakley & Eileen M. Kelly, HMO Liability for Malpractice of Member
Physicians: The Case of IPA Model HMOs, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 624, 634 (1988)).
In one case, the court held that a party can be liable under a breach of war-
ranty theory when the party in question has "clearly and unequivocally warranted
that a course of treatment recommended . . .will, inevitably, produce a certain
result." Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392, 393 (Ct. App.
1979). The court did not find liability because the language upon which the plain-
tiff relied simply claimed that the physician would exercise good judgment. See id.
(ruling that HMO was not liable under breach of warranty theory because treating
physician did no more than make a "generalized promise of a good result").
94. See Bearden & Maegden, supra note 48, at 344-45 (explaining context in
which bad faith may be asserted in connection with HMO administration). There
are many activities conducted by HMOs that may lead a plaintiff to pursue a cause
of action for bad faith or fraud. See Joanne B. Stem, Bad Faith Suits: Are They
Applicable to Health Maintenance Organizations?, 85 W. VA. L. REv. 911, 920 (1983)
(describing context in which potential bad faith claims against HMOs may arise).
These include refusal to approve a referral of the patient to a specialist or to ap-
prove admission for hospital inpatient services, failure to approve diagnostic tests
because of the expense involved, refusal to approve life support for a patient who
has only a slight chance of survival, provision of misleading or deceptive informa-
tion about benefits and coverage either to reduce utilization or induce enrollment,
making administrative errors in enrollment, and refusal to cover experimental pro-
cedures or to approve extensions of hospital stays. See id. at 921-22.
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This author does not advocate doing away with the carpet entirely-just
fixing it so that it lies smoothly and ceases to trip those who seek to cross
it. The reinstatement of a negligence standard and the recognition that
HMOs that overrule individual medical judgment are acting unreasonably
would accomplish this.
The best way to focus attention on the patient's interest is, quite sim-
ply, to hold the HMO responsible for the decisions it makes. A system
exists for doing just this: the tort system. An HMO that overrules its physi-
cian's judgment would be acting unreasonably in doing so for several rea-
sons, all of which are firmly embedded in the law already. These already
embedded legal doctrines include prohibitions against practicing
medicine without a medical degree and a license and the inclusion of neg-
ligent medical practice among the torts. Nor could the HMO employ a
reasonable HMO standard and argue that other HMOs would have acted
similarly. No matter what other HMOs would do, it would be unreasona-
ble to overrule the physician's exercise of reasonable medical judgment.
HMO practice would not be a defense if the HMO standard of conduct is
itself negligent. 95 Overruling the reasonable exercise of medical judg-
ment is itself negligence.
The HMO personnel who intervene between the physician and the
patient to prevent the doctor's judgment from being effectuated have not
themselves met with or treated the patient. Thus, HMO personnel who
prevent the physician's judgment from being exercised are acting irre-
sponsibly in treating a patient from a distance. The process of overruling
the physician's judgment means that the HMO personnel are, in fact,
practicing medicine. If they are not doctors, they are acting illegally in
practicing medicine without a license, and should be accountable for do-
ing so. Moreover, presumably the HMO has hired the doctor to allow the
doctor to exercise his or her trained judgment.9 6 Unless the HMO per-
sonnel are doctors, they are not allowed to practice medicine. If they are
doctors, presumably they are acting in a way unacceptable to the medical
profession in making decisions based solely on statistics and without see-
ing the patient.
An HMO governed by a negligence standard would not be able to
overrule the medical judgment of the physician in his or her reasonable
decision to recommend treatment or tests. Of course, HMOs developed,
in part, in response to the belief that doctors had gone overboard in or-
dering excessive treatments or tests and that the medical system had, as a
whole, been taken into the arena of excessive spending. HMOs developed
to cut costs that were perceived as having run amok. There are those who
would argue that returning complete discretion to physicians would
95. See Low v. Park Price, Co., 503 P.2d 291, 297 (Idaho 1972) (holding that
industry practice was not conclusive evidence of reasonable care).
96. If this is not the case, then HMOs should contend that they do not need
to employ doctors at all. They would only need administrative personnel to apply
the uniform treatment protocols followed by the HMO.
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amount to a return to the excessive spending that HMOs were designed to
cure. The response to this position has two parts. First, HMOs have failed
in their mission to provide less expensive medical care in an equitable
manner. Medical care remains rationed on the basis of wealth. Given the
choice between a return to allegedly excessive medical costs and allowing
HMOs to deepen the divisions between the economic levels in our society,
this author would elect the former.
Second, a balance among all concerns must be possible. Perhaps
medical spending needs to be curtailed. Experience is starting to show
that the HMO approach of uniform standards applied without flexibility
cannot work; that approach provides too little room for individual varia-
tion and needs. HMOs, with the requirement of reasonableness removed
or sporadically reinstituted, have failed to balance the perceived need to
cut medical costs, the interests of their patients and the policy concerns
about providing medical care fairly. They had their chance, and the
amount of micromanaging they have generated from legislatures and
courts proves their failure.
The balance among all concerns can be struck by a return to a reason-
ableness standard. HMOs can operate by attempting to weed out those
referrals, procedures and tests that are unnecessary. Because it is hard to
believe that anyone would openly argue that HMOs exist to curtail neces-
sary procedures, any supervision on their parts should be restricted to cur-
tailing unnecessary ones. Presumably, the idea that medical costs have
become excessive applies only to unnecessary medical costs. Arguing that
necessary medical costs are excessive becomes problematic, because it
must lead to open acceptance of the view that there comes a point beyond
which society would rather have a patient die than pay for the care that the
patient needs.9 7 Thus, allowing HMOs to act as supervisors to make sure
that no unnecessary treatments are supplied to their members would serve
the goal of eliminating unnecessary costs. An HMO acting in such a way
would be acting reasonably, and the HMO would not be liable if sued for
negligence. The HMO's discretion, however, must be fettered by the re-
quirement of reasonableness. This fetter has been ably supplied through
the centuries by tort law. Removing it has led to problems, as this Article
has shown. Existing attempts to refetter HMOs have proven inefficient,
ineffective and underinclusive. We should return to a reasonableness stan-
dard and end the experiment with immunity in one straightforward step.
It is the simplest solution.
97. This view does exist, and has clearly been put into practice in decisions by
Medicare, for example, not to pay for the drugs that an HIV patient needs. See
Pedersen & Larson, supra note 64, at 50 (discussing whether death is cheaper than
13-year treatment with drugs that an HIV-positive patient needs). The issue, how-
ever, has not been openly faced.
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